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The right of revolution in the social contract theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke
is a curious topic. This paper discusses the differences and similarities between the two
philosophers’ discussions of this topic. It is argued that Hobbes and Locke differ most
drastically on the notion of who the sovereign is. While Hobbes prefers to establish the
sovereign as a demigod, Locke understands the sovereign as a mortal, and thus fallible,
man. It is because of this distinction that Hobbes and Locke disagree on the notion of the
right of revolution. Furthermore, the American Founding Fathers, including James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, inherited Locke’s perspective on this matter when
arguing for the independence of the colonies. Finally, it is the conclusion of this paper
that this notion of the right of revolution continues today, when observing the numerous
political revolutions around the world.
4INTRODUCTION
The question of the right of revolution is an interesting dilemma. In a particular
society, should the people reserve the right to revolt against the established order? Should
the sovereign or ruler constantly fear the loss of power? Is this an effective means of
restraining a tyrant? Who knows the best course of action for a particular society – the
people or the ruler? Does the right of revolution result in chaos and instability? What
conditions are necessary for this right to be exacted? These are some of the questions I
hope to pursue in my study of the right or revolution.
Two of the most important political theorists regarding this idea are Thomas
Hobbes and John Locke. While the two disagree substantially on this right, it is my hope
that some similarities can be seen between the two. I have outlined the basic arguments in
Hobbes’ and Locke’s social contract theories, as well as elaborated upon the specific
doctrines each proposes regarding revolution. While Hobbes regards the sovereign as all
powerful and immune from revolution, Locke does permit the people to revolt in
circumstances of long, sustained abuse. This permission is allowed because of Locke’s
notion of the social contract as based upon consent. While Hobbes agrees about the initial
consent regarding the beginning of the social contract, he also believes that the sovereign
must remain independent and autonomous in order for him to be able to enforce the laws
of the land. Furthermore, Hobbes argues that man’s natural state is one of a “war of all
against all.” In such a state, there needs to be a sovereign who can readily correct this
natural imperfection in man. Without supreme, unconditional power, the society would
disintegrate. Locke, however, believes man to be more peaceful. While each man is free
to pursue his own course of action, the original natural state of man is not pure chaos.
5Thus, the difference in the way in which these two philosophers portray the natural state
of man influences the decision of whether the people should be able to revolt. It was my
main finding that, in particular, the way in which the people view the sovereign, as either
supreme and immortal or human and flawed, ultimately determines whether the people
retain the right of revolution.
In particular, I believe this finding is applicable to modern political life.
Whenever the sovereign is viewed as a fallible human being, no more extraordinary than
any other man, the people retain a right to revolt against him. For example, the
contemporary political strife in many countries around the world can be viewed as a
response to tyrannical leadership by a leader who is seen as merely arbitrarily in power.
Without any sort of concept of his qualifications or his supreme ability to lead, the
sovereign loses his ultimate control over the people. And, when the abuses become
excessive, revolution ensues. Thus, while this investigation involves the thought of two
thinkers from centuries ago, I believe the lesson is highly relevant in today’s political
climate.
I first began by treating Hobbes’ Leviathan, then turning to Locke’s Second
Treatise on Government. It is here that the most explicit investigations into the right of
revolution can be found. After outlining the arguments, and comparing the two theories, I
turned to connections to the American Founding. It is clear that these two thinkers, but
particularly Locke, had incredible influence on the Founding Fathers. The Declaration of
Independence, a clear, concise document explicitly outlining the right of revolution,
resonates very much with Locke’s political theory. The Bill of Rights and The Federalist
Papers, too, can be seen as bolstering the right of revolution. Furthermore, these
6documents seek to ensure that the people do not suffer the abuses of a tyrannical
sovereign ever again. After highlighting some of the connections between the political
theory and the American political strife, I summarize my argument for the idea that the
way in which one interprets the sovereign ultimately determines the right of revolution. It
is my hope that this argument is both clear and engaging.
Long live the revolution.
7CHAPTER I – Hobbes, “On Man”
In order to initiate a discussion of Hobbes’ state of nature, it is important to begin
with exactly how Hobbes defines man’s nature. He begins the first part of his work, “Of
Man,” with an explanation of the mental and physical processes at work in man.
Thoughts, in man, derive from sense impressions from external objects. Thought
processes are distinguished between those that are regulated and those which are
unguided. Guided thoughts are further divided into those that seek to explain causes for
given effects and those which inquire into the numerous effects possible from any given
action.1 Central to Hobbes’ definition of man is the distinction between man and beast
and man and God. Many of the qualities of man that separate him from other animals
proceed from the human capacity to utilize speech. Hobbes notes, “For besides sense, and
thoughts, and the train of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion, though by the
help of speech and method the same faculties may be improved to such a height as to
distinguish men from all other living creatures.”2 Furthermore, he notes, “Whatsoever we
imagine is finite. Therefore, there is no idea or conception we call infinite. No man can
have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude.”3 God, then, is that being which man
acknowledges as incomprehensible, yet quantifies in a word so as to honor his existence.
This distinction is prevalent to Hobbes’ state of nature; it helps to equate all humans as
beings that are capable of creating a commonwealth but, without such a society to
restrain each man’s will, all men live in a state of war where each person is entitled to
fulfilling his self-interest.
1 Hobbes, p. 13
2 Hobbes, p. 15
3 Hobbes, p. 15
8Hobbes then discusses human speech which, as previously noted, is one of the
central aspects of the human essence. He elaborates on the importance of speech,
“SPEECH, consisting of names or appellations…whereby men register their thoughts,
recall them when they are past, and also declare them one to another for mutual utility
and conversation, without which there had been amongst men, neither commonwealth,
nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves.”4 It
is clear that speech is not only one of the qualities that distinguish men from beasts, but it
is also a necessary part of man’s rejection of the state of nature and the formation of a
commonwealth. Speech is also necessary for one to reason and to understand science.
Hobbes defines reason, as “nothing but reckoning…of the consequences of general
names agreed upon for the marking and signifying of our thoughts.”5 And, the purpose
of reason is to begin as first principles and to proceed to establish logical consequences.
Furthermore, reason requires one to question the commonly established first principles
because certainty is not the same as unanimity. And, whenever a controversy arises, the
conflicting parties must, “by their own accord set up for right reason of some arbitrator or
judge to whose sentence they will both stand.”6 It is already clear that Hobbes intends to
demonstrate the way in which the commonwealth, as established by the public, is the
reasonable solution to the problems posed by the state of nature. Hobbes summarizes,
“To conclude, the light of human minds is perspicuous words, but by exact definitions
first snuffed and purged from ambiguity; reason is the pace; increase of science, the way;
and the benefit of mankind, the end.”7
4 Hobbes, p. 16
5 Hobbes, p. 23
6 Hobbes, p. 23
7 Hobbes, p. 26
9In addition to speech and reason, man is also comprised of many passions which
influence his actions. Within man is a capacity to endeavor towards things he desires or
to avert things he would prefer to avoid. Pleasure is defined as the appearance or sense of
good, while displeasure is the appearance of sense of evil.8 Hobbes then lists a number of
states and passions that men are capable of, including hope, valor, curiosity, and vanity.
What is most important about these passions, however, is that they indicate the irrational
aspect of human behavior. Furthermore, Hobbes elaborates on man’s capacity for
deliberation as the ability to evaluate future consequences in making a decision. But, he
also notes that man cannot have absolute knowledge of the future, indicating that his
choice is risky. He notes, “In deliberation, the last appetite or aversion immediately
adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the WILL.”9 The will,
then, is the choice man ultimately makes. This intertwines the rational and irrational
aspects of the human person. Man seeks pleasure by willing that course of action which is
most likely to bring positive consequences. But, in selecting a course of action, he uses
his reason in order to evaluate alternative courses of action. Thus, man is constituted as
both a rational and irrational creature.
Hobbes then moves to discuss man’s capacity for knowledge. There is, as has
been previously noted, a judgment which arises from the final action of the will. Hobbes
notes that there is a particular degree of uncertainty associated with our knowledge. He
explains, “No discourse whatsoever can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past or to
come…No man can know by discourse that this or that is, has been, or will be, which is
to know absolutely, but only that if this be, that is, if this has been, that has been, if this
8 Hobbes, p. 29
9 Hobbes, p. 33
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shall be, that shall be, which is to know conditionally.”10 Man, then, cannot enjoy any
particular degree of certainty, but can only use his capacity for reason to evaluate first
principles and derive conclusions. That is not to say, however, that one should simply
accept uncertainty as the end of knowledge. Hobbes indicates that science is the
knowledge of consequences that rests upon first definitions, while opinion rests upon
one’s beliefs. Similar to opinion, belief and faith are grounded on the opinions of another.
In indicating the level of uncertainty central to man’s knowledge, it can be seen that there
is little hope for perfection or an ideal. This detail will be important in Hobbes’
justification of the commonwealth as a best case scenario against the state of nature.
Another topic central to both the state of nature and the formation of the
commonwealth is man’s power. Man is driven by a desire to acquire power, riches, and
honor. He defines the value or worth of man as, “his price…so much as would be given
for the use of his power; and therefore is not absolute, but a thing dependent on the need
and judgment of another.”11 It is important to note the way in which Hobbes incorporates
interpersonal relations. It is important to understand the state of nature and the
commonwealth as communities, or contexts, in which multiple peoples must learn to live
amongst others. Hobbes notes that the greatest power, amongst men, is the civil power,
“which is compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent in one person,
natural or civil, that has the use of all their powers depending on his will, such as is the
power of a commonwealth.”12 It is the significant difference between the ways in which
men interact with others that constitutes the major difference between the state of nature
and the commonwealth. Finally, Hobbes defines worthiness as that which consists in, “a
10 Hobbes, p. 35
11 Hobbes, p. 51
12 Hobbes, p. 50
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particular power or ability for that whereof he is said to be worthy; which particular
ability is usually named FITNESS or Aptitude.”13 Thus, it is not true to say that all people
are equal in all ways. Rather, there are ways in which individuals have a right, or even
deserve something, before others. While all men may be worthy of riches or power, only
particular people actually deserve these things. It must be, then, that there be a civil way
in which these rights are distributed, presumably by the sovereign of the commonwealth,
in order to ensure that these interpersonal relations remain civil.
Hobbes continues, in his chapter entitled “Of the Difference of Manners,” to
discuss the ways in which men may live together in peace. It is here that Hobbes really
begins to indicate the chaotic nature of men when there is no authority present to restrain
each man’s will. He notes, “I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and
restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.”14 Self-interest is central
to Hobbes’ understanding of man’s nature. He does note, however, that man’s reason for
acting like this is not purely to accumulate riches. He states, “the cause of this is not
always that man hopes for a more intensive delight than he has already attainted to, or
that he cannot be content with a moderate power, but because he cannot be assure the
power and means to live well, which he hath present without the acquisition of more.”15
The competition between men arises not from greed but, rather, from a fear that another
man will use his power to subjugate those who are weaker than him. Thus, the main
motivation in competing with another to accumulate as much as he can is mainly a
concern for self-preservation.
13 Hobbes, p. 57
14 Hobbes, p. 58
15 Hobbes, p. 58
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Hobbes continues to discuss traits natural in man that cause all men to seek refuge
under a sole authority. He notes, “Desire of ease and sensual delight disposeth men to
obey a common power, because by such desires a man doth abandon the protection might
be hope for from his own industry and labour. Fear of death and wounds disposeth to the
same, and for the same reason.”16 Furthermore, fear of oppression by another drives men
into society. Thus, Hobbes argues here that society is a necessary end. It is the only way
men can ensure safety for all. With the absolute authority of one power, each man can
guarantee that the law will be upheld. Assuming that law is derived from the Natural
Law, it will aim to establish equality for all men. And, as such, the society will be the
only thing that will guarantee men safety, while simultaneously maintaining the equality
of the state of nature.
After discussing the numerous characteristics of man, Hobbes finally addresses
the natural condition of man. He begins by noting that Nature has created men equal. As
equals, there is also a similar desire in all men to achieve his goals. When two men desire
the same thing, the result is enmity. To overcome one’s enemy, man must either destroy
of subdue his competitor. All men are capable of anticipating the danger ahead, so
Hobbes understands that it is rational for all men to overcome any threat he perceives to
his life or liberty. Hobbes explains, “So that in the nature of man we find three principal
causes of quarrel: first, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first maketh
men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation.”17 Thus, without
a common power to oversee the actions of all men, the state of nature is actually a state of
war. Hobbes elaborates, “For WAR consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting,
16 Hobbes, p. 58
17 Hobbes, p. 76
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but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known.”18 It is
not that Hobbes believes all men to constantly be thrashing at each other or usurping
another’s land. Rather, it is the possibility of this occurring that throws man into a state of
fear such that he may preemptively act upon another in order to defend himself. Hobbes,
however, does not condemn men for acting this way. He clarifies, “neither of us accuse
man’s nature in it. The desires and other passions of man are in themselves no sin. No
more are the actions that proceed from these passion, till they know a law that forbids
them – which till laws be made they cannot know. Nor can any law be made, till they
have agreed upon the person that shall make it.”19 Until all men have established a
commonwealth where a sovereign enjoys absolute power, all men have a right to all
things. As a result, neither safety nor security may be enjoyed and man must defend
himself through his own force. He summarizes, “To this war of every man against every
man, this also is consequent: nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong,
justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no
law; where no law, no injustice.”20 Thus, without a common power, all men are subject to
all other men, without a guarantee of life or liberty.
Hobbes, after briefly introducing the natural state of man, establishes two
fundamental Laws of Nature. He begins, “The RIGHT OF NATURE…is the liberty of
each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own
nature, that is to say, of his own life, and consequently of doing anything which, in his
own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.”21 As was
18 Hobbes, p. 76
19 Hobbes, p. 77
20 Hobbes, p. 78
21 Hobbes, p. 79
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previously established, all men are created inherently equal. Here, Hobbes goes further
and guarantees that man has the right to defend his life by any means he believes
necessary in order to achieve that goal. To differentiate from a right of nature, Hobbes
then defines a Law of Nature as, “a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by
which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the
means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh is may best be
preserved.”22 It is clear that self-interest and self-preservation are the main principles of
the state of nature. Yet, all the men who live in the state of nature are entitled to the same
rights, as found in the Laws of Nature, given that all men have the capacity for reason. He
continues, “For though they that speak of this subject use to confuse right and law, yet
they ought to be distinguished, because RIGHT consisteth in liberty to do or to forebear,
whereas LAW determineth and bindeth to one of them; so that law and right differ as
much as obligation and liberty.”23 It is sensible for Hobbes to make this distinction.
Hobbes has previously indicated that society works because it has laws which a sovereign
utilizes to order and restrain the people. Thus, it is clear that, in the state of nature, one
operates under a universal right to all things. And, while it is not accurate to say that the
Law of Nature restrains man anymore than his natural universal right, it is the word law
that must be redefined to mean something less extreme than right. For, without this
distinction, civil law would not permit the sovereign absolute authority.
Hobbes, having established the state of war men naturally find themselves in, then
formulates the first Law of Nature. He begins, “And therefore, as long as this natural
right of every man to everything endureth, there can be no security to an man of living
22 Hobbes, p. 79
23 Hobbes, p. 80
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out the time which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a
precept, or general rule, of reason that every man out to endeavour peace, as far as he
has hope of obtaining it, and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps
and advantages of war.”24 While Hobbes recognizes that men would prefer peace to a
state of war, he also acknowledges that all men must universally agree to this pursuit.
Without the consent of all men, the attempt is thwarted. If I cannot guarantee that you
will not try to take my life, then I cannot sacrifice my right to defend myself. But, at the
same time, I would prefer to live peacefully than to constantly face the threat of war.
Thus, Hobbes presents the First Law of Nature: to seek peace. From this, the Second Law
of Nature can be derived: “that a man be willing, when others are so to, as far-forth as
for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all
things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would all other
men against himself.”25 It is here that Hobbes begins to develop the social contract which
is so central to his political theory. Man reserves the right to sacrifice part of his natural
right, should all other men do the same, in order to forfeit this power to a sovereign who
will then ensure the safety and security of all his subjects. If all men do not hold up their
end of the contract, it would be foolish for any man to do so for he would merely be
exposing himself to danger. Thus, Hobbes establishes two Laws of Nature, to seek peace
and to make contracts, which will help to understand the beginnings of the
commonwealth.
After indicating that a man must sacrifice some of his natural right to seek peace,
Hobbes details exactly how one might approach this task. He notes, “To lay down a
24 Hobbes, p. 80
25 Hobbes, p. 80
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man’s right to anything is to divest himself of the liberty of hindering another of the
benefit of his own right to the same.”26 It is not that one gives any other man a right he
had not before, but only that he no longer impedes the other in his enjoyment of his
original right. One may set aside this right either by renouncing it or transferring it to
another. Hobbes explains, “By simply RENOUNCING, when he cares not to whom the
benefit thereof redoundeth. By TRANSFERRING, when he intendeth the benefit thereof
to some certain person or persons.”27 It will be the transferring of this right which will be
most important to the discussion of the sovereign, for it is he who all men trust to sustain
the commonwealth. Hobbes continues, “And when a man hath in either manner
abandoned or granted away his right, then is he said to be OBLIGED or BOUND not to
hinder those to whom such right is granted or abandoned from the benefit of it; and that
he ought, and it is his DUTY, not to make void that involuntary act of his own, and that
such hindrance is INJUSTICE.”28 Hobbes had said earlier in his discourse that ideas of
justice were only relevant when laws were present. Thus, when one transfers some of his
natural right to the sovereign, it begins the creation of laws such that one is obliged to act
in accordance with the law, or else commit injustice.
In his fifteenth chapter, Hobbes details several other Laws of Nature that are
important in order to understand more about the state of man. The third law, which
requires man to perform any covenant made, indicates that man must observe his
obligations. It is this third law which is the basis for justice. He explains, “For where no
convenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred, and every man has right to
everything; and consequently no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then
26 Hobbes, p. 81
27 Hobbes, p. 81
28 Hobbes, p. 81
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to break it is unjust.”29 Hobbes defends that justice is not contrary to reason, for one must
perform his obligations in order to sustain the commonwealth. The society, which was
meant to preserve peace, must rely on men to act reasonably so as to prevent dissolution
of the commonwealth and a return to the state of war. Hobbes goes even further and
argues that rebellion is actually contrary to reason. He affirms, “And for that instance of
attaining sovereignty by rebellion, it is manifest that…because it cannot reasonably be
expected…and because (by gaining it so) others are taught to gain the same in like
manner, the attempt thereof is against reason.”30 For Hobbes, the violations of the
covenant have damaging consequences. If men learn that violations of the covenants and
dissolution of the commonwealth is justified, then at every slight annoyance, rebellion
will occur. This creates a dangerous pattern, and thus he must claim that rebellion is
contrary to reason for all it leads to is a return to the state of war. He concludes, “The
names of just and unjust…when they are attributed to men…signify conformity or
inconformity of manners to reason. But when they are attributed to actions, they signify
the conformity or inconformity to reason, not of manners or manner of life, but of
particular actions.”31 Thus, reason is necessary for the enactment of justice and the
sustaining of the commonwealth.
After explicitly detailing the rest of his Laws of Nature, Hobbes summarized his
discourse into one general principle. This general rule is merely a reformulation of the
“Golden Rule.” He states, “[the Laws] have been contracted into one easy sum,
intelligible even to the meanest capacity, and that is Do not that to another, which though
29 Hobbes, p. 89
30 Hobbes, p. 92
31 Hobbes, p. 93
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wouldst not have done to thyself.”32 What is interesting about this form of the principle,
though, is that it is stated negatively. So, while man is free to do anything in a state of
nature, one must consider the repercussions of that action. It is this self-restraint that can
induce all men to form a commonwealth. Hobbes continues to assert that, while these
Laws act in man’s conscience at all times, they are not necessary rules unless the
situation is one of concern to a man’s security. While the Laws are eternal, they are not
necessarily applicable unless one can guarantee that all other men are acting according to
the Laws. Furthermore, these Laws simply require man to attempt to follow them, and
this attempt makes him just. Thus, to use Hobbes’ language, if one can endeavor to
pursue the morally good path and can seek peace, then he can also act in accordance with
the Laws of Nature.
In his final chapter of Part I, Hobbes finally formulates his concise summary of
the definition of the person. He defines the person as follows: “A person is he whose
words or actions are considered either as his own, or as representing the words or
actions of another man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether truly
or by fiction.”33 This is a somewhat ambiguous definition, for it appears that by the term
“person,” Hobbes does not just mean the individual actor. Rather, the person could also
be a representative of some other author. In this final chapter, he begins to develop the
relationship between an actor and an author, which will be important as he begins to
focus on the relationship between the sovereign and the subject in Part II. Hobbes details
that, through a covenant, an actor may act on behalf of the author. But, the author, should
this action require a breach of the law, should be held responsible. Thus, it is the author
32 Hobbes, p. 99
33 Hobbes, p. 101
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of the act who must assume responsibility, not necessarily the person who actually
performs the action itself. The author, however, need not be one individual. Rather,
Hobbes argues, “A multitude of men are made one person, when they are by one man, or
one person, represented so that it be done with the consent of every one of that multitude
in particular.”34 Thus begins Hobbes’ theory of the multitude represented by the sole
sovereign. The multitude of people, in this situation, is the author, while the sovereign is
merely the actor. He must act on behalf of the will of each individual in order to maintain
his authority. But, Hobbes walks a very fine line here. He notes, “every man giving their
common representer authority from himself in particular, and owning all the actions the
representer doth, in case they give him authority without stint; otherwise, when they limit
him in what, and how far, he shall represent them, none of them owneth more than they
gave him commission to act.”35Thus, when sacrificing his own personal authority, each
man transfers part of his own authority to the representative. But, it is not exactly clear
whether this authority is absolute, or if it is checked. Hobbes does not refer to the
representative as an author, so it is unclear, at this point, whether he merely represents the
will of the people, or if his personal will can be seen as a reflection of the people’s own.
This discussion of the sovereign’s power will be important when examining the rights the
subjects retain, even in civil society.
In order to fully appreciate Hobbes’ political theory, one must understand how
exactly he defines man and the state of nature. As the previous discussion has indicated,
Hobbes believes the natural state of man to be plagued by chaos and disorder. He
understands all men as equals, distinct from beasts with capacities for speech, thought,
34 Hobbes, p. 104
35 Hobbes, p. 104
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reason, and knowledge. At the same time, men are viewed as power-hungry and
competitive. In order to attain some sort of order, Hobbes believes all men must agree to
transfer some right to a sole representative who will act on behalf of the will of the
multitude. Only with this action can men ensure security and peace. In Part II, entitled
“Of Commonwealth,” Hobbes will elaborate on the origins and structure of the
commonwealth, the position of the sovereign, and the relationship between the sovereign
and the subjects. With this introduction to Hobbes’ theory on the state of man, it should
be clear how his political theory logically follows.
21
CHAPTER II – Hobbes, “On Commonwealth”
Hobbes begins the second part of his Leviathan by introducing the origination and
the development of the commonwealth. Hobbes begins, “The final cause, end, or design
of men…in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves in which we see them live
in commonwealths is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented
life.”36 Men, thus, form commonwealths as a necessary way to avoid the state of war.
But, as he briefly indicated in Part I, Hobbes asserts that there must be a sovereign to
oversee the actions of all men and to punish those who do not act in accordance with the
law. Without fear of punishment, men will view the society as meaningless and will
return to a state of war. Hobbes elaborates, “For the laws of nature (as justice, equity,
modesty, mercy and (in sum) doing to others as we would be done to) of themselves,
without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural
passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like.”37 As Hobbes noted
previously, man may always be obliged to the Laws of Nature in his conscience, but not
necessarily in his actions. If there is no authority to ensure the peace and security of all,
then each individual cannot guarantee that no other man will forego his part of the
covenant. As such, man may as well be in the state of war, and thus his security could be
threatened. Hobbes noted that man was not obliged to act in accordance with the Laws of
Nature should his personal security be threatened. Thus, the authority is a necessary part
of the commonwealth, for without this central figure, men would not feel bound to the
civil laws.
36 Hobbes, p. 106
37 Hobbes, p. 106
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After indicating the necessity of a sovereign power, Hobbes describes the way
that men may establish this power. He states:
“The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to defend them from the
invasion of foreign and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such
sort as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish
themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their power and strength upon one man,
or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto
one will, which is as much as to say, to appoint one man or assembly of men to bear their
person, and every one to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he
that so beareth their person shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern
the common peace and safety, and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and
their judgments, to his judgment.”38
Thus, in order to form a commonwealth, each man must sacrifice his individual right and
transfer it to the sovereign. In the final chapter of Part I, Hobbes had explained that men
must transfer their rights to a sovereign power so he could act upon the common will of
the people. But, this statement in Part II appears stronger. Hobbes is now willing to
permit the sovereign to use his own authority, in matters of common peace and safety, as
representative of the authority of the people. It is only through this sacrifice, Hobbes
believes, that a commonwealth can be established. He explains, “This is more than
consent…it is real unity of them all…made by covenant of every man with every man, in
such manner as if every man should say to every man I authorize and give up my right of
governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give
up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner.”39 While Hobbes had
previously referred to his leader as a representative, it appears he is now willing to grant
this sovereign his own authority. While this authority must derive from each man’s
individual sacrifice, it still gives the position of the sovereign much greater power.
38 Hobbes, p. 109
39 Hobbes, p 109
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Hobbes continues to strengthen the will and power of the sovereign as he
elaborates upon the structure of the commonwealth. He explains:
“This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH. This
is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather…of that Mortal God to which we
owe, under the Immortal God, our peace and defence. For by his authority, given him by
every particular man in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and
strength conferred on him that by terror thereof he is enabled to conform the wills of
them all to peace at home and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him
consisteth the essence of the commonwealth, which (to define it) is one person, of whose
acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves
every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all as he shall
think expedient, for their peace and common defence. And he that carrieth this person is
called SOVEREIGN, and said to have Sovereign Power; and every one besides, his
SUBJECT.”40
Hobbes uses very strong language when he begins to describe the commonwealth and the
sovereign. He compares the representative to a god, implying some sort of infallibility or
reverence such that the subjects must always support his will. Furthermore, Hobbes
grants the sovereign such unlimited power. When defining the commonwealth, he notes
that the sovereign, “may use the strength and means of them all as he shall think
expedient.” It is clear that Hobbes instills much trust within the sovereign himself, for he
is permitted to act according to his own will, assuming that his will is in line with that of
the people. It does not appear to be a concern for Hobbes that the sovereign himself
could, in fact, be corrupt. For Hobbes, this absolute authority is better than the chaos of
the state of nature, and thus the sovereign is permitted such strong power.
After indicating the initial need for a sovereign, Hobbes moves on to elaborate on
the particular rights of the sovereign. The first of these rights is eternal obedience of the
subjects to the sovereign. Hobbes details that the people, “cannot lawfully make a new
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covenant amongst themselves to be obedient to any other…without his permission.”41
This appears to be Hobbes’ attempt to justify absolute authority. It should be kept in
mind, however, that the sovereign does have a duty to maintain the peace and security of
his people. Thus, Hobbes notes, “because the right of bearing the person of them all is
given to him they make sovereign by covenant only of one to another…there can happen
no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign.”42 So, it then seems that the sovereign
does have some limits to his power. He must act in accordance with the covenant all his
subjects made with each other that initially transferred their individual rights to him in the
pursuit of peace. But, Hobbes then moves in the other direction. He explains, “That he
which is made sovereign maketh no covenant with his subjects beforehand is manifest,
because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the covenant, or
he must make a several covenant with every man.”43 Thus, it appears that the sovereign
does not actually have to formulate a covenant with each of his subjects. As such, he
cannot commit any unjust act, for none of his actions could be against the covenant which
he did not form. If the sovereign cannot do anything unjust, then there appears no way
that could justify the subjects in dissolving his power. And, without a covenant between
him and his subjects, it seems like there can be no limits to his power.
Hobbes, having established that the sovereign does not participate in a covenant,
then moves to demonstrate that no man can legitimately protest against the sovereign
himself. He explains, “because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a
sovereign, he that dissented must now consent with the rest, that is, be contented to avow
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all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest.”44 Each man must now
conform to the will of the universal and subject himself to the authority of the sovereign
if he wishes to preserve the society. Thus, the commonwealth operates under the
authority of the majority. And, furthermore, the subject cannot question the authority of
this power. Hobbes states, “because every subject is by this institution author of all the
actions and judgments of the sovereign instituted, it follows that, whatsoever he doth, it
can be no injury to any of his subjects, nor ought he to be by any of them accused of
injustice.”45 Thus, Hobbes not only grants the sovereign absolute power, he also does not
allow the subjects to question his use of such power. He elaborates, “no man that hath
sovereign power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his subjects
punished.”46 Again, it is clear that Hobbes has a deep trust in the good moral fabric of his
sovereign. For Hobbes, order and stability are the most important goals, and it appears
that he will allow any means necessary to attain that goal.
After introducing the sovereign’s power in general, Hobbes details the exact
powers that the specific institution of the sovereign enjoys. The sovereign can decide the
boundaries of property, he is the impartial judge in situations of controversy, he decides
when a commonwealth goes to war, and he can decide whom to reward and punish. Most
important, Hobbes notes, “These are the rights which make the essence of sovereignty,
and which are the marks whereby a man may discern in what man, or assembly of men,
the sovereign power is placed and resideth. For these are incommunicable and
inseparable.”47 Thus, it is not permissible for a sovereign to transfer any of these powers
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to others, for the authors of the commonwealth, being the people, specifically transferred
their right to him. After indicating all the powers of the sovereign, it is the final section of
Chapter XVIII which demonstrates Hobbes’ attempt to justify his granting the sovereign
unlimited power. He attempts to address the concern that, in his political model, the
subject is left miserable and powerless against the sovereign. One might object that the
sovereign, being a man or assembly of men, could just as easily succumb to his passions
and act out of self-interest. Hobbes’ response is not very comforting. He states, “And
commonly, they that live under a monarch think it the fault of monarchy, and they that
live under the government of democracy or other sovereign assembly attribute all the
inconvenience to that form of commonwealth…not considering that the estate of man can
never be without some incommodity or other.”48 For Hobbes, the reason to permit the
sovereign to have limitless power is simply because the alternative, a return to the state of
war, is much worse. He dismisses the concerns of the subject as merely a projection of
his own personal unhappiness onto the commonwealth itself. Rather, Hobbes suggests,
one should consider how much worse things could be. Thus, Hobbes justifies the
sovereign and the commonwealth as merely the best solution to a problem that simply has
no perfect answer.
After detailing the specific rights of the sovereign, Hobbes addresses the different
forms this sovereign power can take. The commonwealth can take three forms:
monarchy, democracy, and aristocracy. He defines these as follows: “When the
representative is one man, then is the commonwealth a MONARCHY; when an assembly
of all that will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or popular commonwealth;
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when an assembly of a part only, then it is called an ARISOCRACY.”49 Whichever form
of commonwealth the people establish, it is this institution that has unlimited power.
There is, however, a difference between these three types of commonwealth. Hobbes
defends that under monarchy the will of the sovereign is the same as the will of the
people. He states, “Now in monarchy the private interest is the same with the public…For
no king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure, whose subjects are either poor, or
contemptible, or too weak…whereas in democracy, or aristocracy, the public prosperity
confers not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth
many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a civil war.”50 The monarch,
then, necessarily depends on the success of the people in order to thrive. The assemblies
involved in democracies and aristocracies do not depend as much on the interests of the
whole public in order to succeed. In addition to this, the monarch also enjoys the counsel
of experts and a lack of inconstancy in opinion since he is the sole decision maker.
Hobbes admits that the monarch can overstep his bounds by depriving any subject of his
possessions. But, Hobbes is also quick to defend that a sovereign assembly can perform a
similar action, and thus the fault is one attributable to the sovereign instead of the specific
monarch. The only other issue posed for monarchies is the right of succession. Hobbes
defends that the right of deciding a successor is determined by the sovereign himself.
While one could maintain that the right should be given back to the multitude, Hobbes
argues that, with the death of the present sovereign, the multitude returns to a state of
nature. As such, each individual can subject himself to who he believes should be
sovereign. Since this is clearly a chaotic process, Hobbes prefers to just grant the right to
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the sovereign himself. He notes, “Therefore, it is manifest that by the institution of
monarchy the disposing of the successor is always left to the judgment and will of the
present possessor.”51 Thus, after establishing the specific rights of the sovereign himself,
Hobbes has defended that there are no inherent flaws within the system of monarchy.
Hobbes, after establishing the rights of the sovereign, addresses the rights of the
subjects. He begins, “a FREE-MAN is he that in those things which by his strength and
wit he is able to do is not hindered to do what he has a will to.”52 The free man, then, is
one who can, at liberty, pursue his own free will. Hobbes goes further, joining necessity
and liberty. He states, “in the actions which men voluntarily do, which, because they
proceed from their will, proceed from liberty, and yet, because every act of man’s will
and every desire and inclination proceedeth from some cause…they proceed from
necessity.”53 This necessity, which derives from God, determines the will of man, which
he is at liberty to utilize. But, this natural liberty is not the same as civil liberty. Since
man has created the commonwealth, he has also created new laws to which he must
subject himself. But, these laws, in order to be effective, must have an effective means of
execution. The limit on the subject’s liberty, then, depends on the sovereign’s
determinations in what actions are permitted. Hobbes then turns to determine exactly
what rights the subjects retain in the commonwealth, even if it does not conform to the
will of the sovereign. He explains, “For in the act of our submission consisteth both our
obligation and our liberty, which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from
thence, there being no obligation on any man which ariseth not from some act of his own;
for all men equally are by nature free. And because such arguments must either be drawn
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from the express words I authorize all his actions, or from the intention of him that
submitteth himself to his power…the obligation and liberty of the subject is to be
derived, either from those words or else from the end of the institution of sovereignty,
namely, the peace of the subjects within themselves, and their defence against a common
enemy.”54 Thus, through the transferring of rights to the sovereign for the creation and
preservation of the commonwealth, there remain some rights which man cannot actually
transfer. Specifically, the subjects cannot be ordered to injure or kill themselves, to
confess to crimes he has committed, or to participate in wars. Furthermore, Hobbes
emphasizes the greatest liberty as the silence of the law. He explains, “As for other
liberties, they depend on the silence of the law. In cases where the sovereign has
prescribed no rule, there the subject hath the liberty to do or forbear, according to his own
discretion.”55 Thus, Hobbes obliges each subject to act in accordance with the civil laws,
but still grants the multitude an absolute right to the preservation of their lives.
In addition to this, Hobbes details some specific rights that the subjects have in
regard to their relation to the sovereign. Hobbes details a strange doctrine whereby the
subject is capable of suing the sovereign if the sovereign takes the property of the subject
or is indebted to a subject only if the sovereign acted in accordance with legal precedent.
If he did so by virtue of his own sovereignty, then the subject cannot retaliate against the
sovereign. After introducing this peculiar idea, Hobbes elaborates on when the subjects
are no longer obliged to follow the sovereign. He begins, “The obligation of subjects to
the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which
he is able to protect them. For the right men have by nature to protect themselves, when
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none else can protect them, can by no covenant be relinquished.”56 This absolute right to
self-preservation is central to the understanding of the power of the sovereign. Without
this guarantee, the sovereign loses his power over his subjects. The reason why men enter
into a commonwealth is to escape the state of war. As a result, if war infiltrates the
commonwealth itself, then there is no sense in limiting the natural rights of humans
anymore; all will have returned to a state of war. Hobbes continues, “And though
sovereignty, in the intention of them that make it, be immortal, yet is it in its own nature,
not only subject to violent death by foreign war, but also through the ignorance and
passions of men it hath in it, and from the very institution, many seeds of a natural
mortality by intestinal discord.”57 While Hobbes had previously indicated that the
sovereignty was eternal, he recognizes that there is some degree to which it depends on
the preservation of peace. And, when that preservation of peace is no longer guaranteed,
man returns to his state of nature and can pursue any means necessary to preserve his life.
Furthermore, there are three other conditions under which a subject is no longer required
to honor the sovereign: first, if the monarch relinquishes his sovereignty without an heir
apparent, then the multitude is able to return to its natural state and establish a new
sovereign; if a subject is banished from the commonwealth, then he is no longer required
to follow the sovereign; and, if a sovereign is subdued by another ruler, then his subjects
must honor their new ruler. While Hobbes does accept particular circumstances in which
the subjects are permitted to reject the authority of the sovereign, it is usually only when
external circumstances, in particular war, have disrupted the ruling of the sovereign.
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After establishing the rights of the sovereign and the liberties of the subjects in the
commonwealth, Hobbes then turns to the different structures of the government itself. He
begins first by defining systems which are groups of men who share some mutual
interest. He defines regular systems as, “those where one man or assembly of men is
constituted representative of the whole number. All other are irregular.”58 The political
systems are those which contain some sovereign who maintains authority over the
members of the system. The sovereign, who is the absolute representative, can permit
lesser representatives to have some limited power within the system. And, this lesser
representative derives his rights from either explicit direction of the sovereign or by the
established laws of the commonwealth. Whether the representative is one man or an
assembly, it does not matter except for the determination of the responsibility of the
actions committed by the representative. If the representative is one man, then, naturally,
he alone is held responsible for the actions he performs on behalf of the subjects of the
commonwealth. But, if the representative is an assembly of men, only those who
supported any action are held responsible. Hobbes, in an effort to differentiate the
representative from the sovereign continues, “It is manifest by this that in bodies politic,
subordinate and subject to a sovereign power, it is sometimes not only lawful, but
expedient, for a particular man to make open protestation against the decrees of the
representative assembly…But in a sovereign assembly that liberty is taken away, both
because he that protesteth there denies their sovereignty, and also because whatsoever is
commanded by the sovereign power is as to the subject…justified by the command.”59
Thus, since the representative does not enjoy absolute power, he may also be subject to
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protest. But, because the sovereign does enjoy this type of power, except in a few
particular cases previously mentioned, it is unjust to resist the will of the sovereign.
Again, it is clear the power and prevalence Hobbes places in the sovereign.
Hobbes, through the text, has compared to the commonwealth to the human body.
It is no surprise, then, that he dedicates one chapter to the “Nutrition and Procreation of a
Commonwealth. He emphasizes that the growth of a commonwealth depends on the,
“plenty and distribution of materials conducing to life; in concoction (or preparation); and
(when concocted) in the conveyance of it, by convenient conduits, to the public use.”60
Thus, the success of a nation depends partly on the natural resources of the
commonwealth, as well as how those resources are distributed. Hobbes focuses more on
the latter part of this distinction. He notes, “For where there is no commonwealth, there
is…a perpetual war of every man against his neighbour; and therefore everything is his
that getteth it, and keepeth it by force; which is neither propriety, nor community, but
uncertainty…Seeing therefore the introduction of propriety is an effect of
commonwealth, which can do nothing but by the person that represents it, it is the act
only of the sovereign, and consisteth in his laws, which none can make that have not the
sovereign power.”61 Without a commonwealth, private property cannot exist. It is part of
the office of the sovereign, then, to distribute this property and delegate property rights.
In doing so, Hobbes notes that there are some regulations by which he must abide. He
notes, “the first law is for division of the land itself, wherein the sovereign assigneth to
every man a portion, according as he…shall judge agreeable to equity and the common
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good.”62 With this private land, each man is then able to exclude all others, except the
sovereign from what is determined to be his property. Because anything the sovereign
does cannot be unjust, it is the sovereign’s judgment of equity and the common good that
are taken as the standard. But, what is peculiar, is that Hobbes notes that the sovereign
can act out of self-interest. He explains, “It is true that a sovereign monarch, or the
greater part of a sovereign assembly, may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of
their passions, contrary to their own consciences, which is a breach of true, and of the law
of nature; but this is not enough to authorize any subject, either to make war upon, or so
much as to accuse of injustice or any way to speak evil of, their sovereign.”63 Again,
while Hobbes notes that the sovereign can overstep his boundaries and pursue his
personal desires, he cannot be thwarted in his pursuit. Because each man sacrifices part of
his own natural right to the sovereign so he can preserve the common good, each man
cannot subsequently deny the sovereign any of his rights. Thus, Hobbes continues to
bolster the power of the sovereign.
Hobbes concludes his chapter “Of the Nutrition and Procreation of a
Commonwealth” by discussing the role of money in the commonwealth. This doctrine is
important particularly as it relates to Locke’s doctrine on the relationship between
property and money. Hobbes begins, “For gold and silver, being (as it happens) almost in
all countries of the world, highly valued, is a commodious measure of the value of all
things else between nations; and money…is a sufficient measure of the value of all things
else, between the subjects of that commonwealth.”64 Money is the means through which
people can perform commercial transactions. Furthermore, it can also be used across
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different nations. He details, “The conduits and ways by which it is conveyed to the
public use are of two sorts: one that conveyeth it to the public coffers; the other that
issueth the same out again for public payments.”65 He compares money to the blood of
the commonwealth and he notes that the inflow and outflow of money parallels the
operations of the human heart. This allusion to the human body permits Hobbes to
conclude this chapter with a discussion on the procreation of the commonwealth. He
notes, “The procreation of a commonwealth are those we call plantations or colonies,
which are numbers of men sent out from the commonwealth, under a conductor or
governor, to inhabit a foreign country, either formerly void of inhabitants, or maid void
then by war.”66 Thus, the commonwealth can grow so much that it can flow beyond its
bounds and conquer new territories. Now, what is interesting here, though, is that, if the
commonwealth remains tied to the sovereign, the inhabitants of the commonwealth must
necessarily be expatriates of the commonwealth itself or the subjects of a commonwealth
that was displaced by war. If they are not, then it would appear that the sovereign has no
right over these people, since they never agreed to subject themselves to this sovereign.
Again, it is clear that Hobbes hopes to keep building up the powers of the sovereign.
With the relationship between the sovereign and his subjects established and some
of the details of the commonwealth itself worked out, Hobbes turns to a discussion of
civil law. He defines the laws in general as those laws that men must observe as members
of a commonwealth. He offers a fuller explanation when he states, “CIVIL LAW is to
ever subject, those rules which the commonwealth hath commanded him (by word,
writing, or other sufficient sign of the will) to make use of, for the distinction of right and
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wrong, that is to say, of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the rule.”67 The law,
then, is a command that is meant to be clear and unbiased. The legislator of these laws, as
one can probably guess, is the sovereign himself. But, it is Hobbes’ next claim which
appears most disturbing. He notes, “The sovereign of a commonwealth, be it an assembly
or one man, is not subject to the civil laws. For having power to make and repeal laws, he
may, when he pleaseth, free himself from that subjection by repealing those laws that
trouble him and making of new.”68 The sovereign, then, can create laws for all his
subjects but does not need to be subject to these laws. Again, it is clear that Hobbes trusts
the actions of the sovereign such that he permits him such limitless power. He must
believe that the sovereign will act in accordance with the universal will, which his
personal will subsequently reflects, in order to guarantee that this state could actually
exist. In support of this point, he elaborates, “The law of nature and the civil law contain
each other, and are of equal extent. For the laws of nature, which consist in equity,
justice, gratitude, and other moral virtues on these depending in the condition of mere
nature…are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace and obedience.
When a commonwealth is once settled, then are they actually laws.”69 Thus, since the
sovereign creates laws that are in accordance with the laws of nature, and the laws of
nature are based on moral virtues, then it must be that the sovereign only makes laws that
are good. As a result, Hobbes can permit the legislator to hold such extensive power.
Hobbes continues to differentiate between the natural and civil law. He notes that civil
laws require a sovereign to execute the ideas consistent in the laws. He notes that the
moral principles are the basis for the civil law. Furthermore, the civil law is part of the
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natural law. Since justice is a natural law, and justice is defined as following the covenant
with the sovereign, then the adherence to the civil law has, within it, a subjection to
natural law. The biggest difference between the two, then, is that the civil law is
explicitly expressed and can restrain the natural liberty of man, while the natural law is
found by reason and necessarily assumes the use of natural liberty.
In determining what constitutes laws, Hobbes develops several criteria. He notes,
“the law is a command, and a command consisteth in declaration or manifestation of the
will of him that commandeth (by voice, writing, or some other sufficient argument of the
same), we may understand that the command of the commonwealth is law only to those
that have means to take notice of it.”70 Thus, the civil law must explicitly be made known
to the people. Otherwise, the distinction between the civil law and the natural law is no
longer. He furthers his argument by stating, “And first, if it be a law that obliges all the
subjects without exception, and is not written, nor otherwise published in such places as
they may take notice thereof, it is a law of nature.”71 If the law is known to all, and it is
not part of a specific document of laws, then it must be a law of nature. Furthermore, men
know these laws through the capacity for reason. Hobbes defines another condition of a
law of nature, saying, “if it be a law that obliges only some condition of men, or one
particular man, and be not written, nor published by word, then also it is a law of nature,
and known by the same arguments and signs that distinguish those in such a condition
from other subjects.”72 Therefore, the laws of nature are those that can be derived from
the human capacity for reason and, as a result, must be accessible by all without an
explicit explanation.
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Just as civil law must be known through explicit declaration, it also requires a
known legislator. Hobbes details, “The author, or legislator, is supposed in every
commonwealth to be evident, because he is sovereign, who having been constituted by
the consent of everyone is supposed by everyone to be sufficiently known.”73 Because
each man had a part in establishing the sovereign, his authority is already known to all
men. Thus, it is necessary for the establishment of a commonwealth, which requires a
sovereign to be created, that there will be civil laws. And, as has been discussed
previously, because the sovereign derives his power from the consent of each individual,
he cannot be resisted. But it is not just the mere existence of the authority that makes
these laws applicable. Furthermore, the law, being just words, is capable of many
interpretations. Hobbes notes, “For it is not the letter, but the intendment, or meaning in
which the nature of the law consisteth; and therefore the interpretation of all laws
dependeth on the authority sovereign, and the interpretation can be none but those which
the sovereign shall appoint.” 74 Thus, not only does the sovereign reserve the right to
establish the law, he also has the power to interpret the actual meaning of the law. And, in
cases of the natural law, the interpretation is reserved to the judge whom the sovereign
appoints. Hobbes states, “The interpretation of the law of nature is the sentence of the
judge constituted by the sovereign authority to head and determine such controversies as
depend thereon, and consisteth in the application of the law to the present case.”75 Thus,
the sovereign indirectly has control over the application of the natural law, too. The
power, for Hobbes, must be consolidated in this sovereign in order to ensure the stability
of the commonwealth.
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Hobbes, after indicating that judges maintain the privilege of interpreting the
natural law, declares that judicial rulings do not establish precedence. It is interesting
that, with the consent of the sovereign, the judge’s decisions do not require all other
judges to rule similarly. Hobbes explains, “But because there is no judge, subordinate nor
sovereign, but may err in a judgment of equity, if afterward, in another like case, he find
it more consonant to equity to give a contrary sentence, he is obliged to do it. No man’s
error becomes his own law, nor obliges him to persist in it.”76 Perhaps, because this judge
is not the actual sovereign, Hobbes is recognizing that the human capacity for error will
infiltrate the commonwealth itself. It is interesting that Hobbes allows the decisions of the
judges on the natural law to be temporary and amendable. He does defend that the natural
law is eternal, and thus the decisions of judges that act contrary to this law cannot be
accepted. Yet, Hobbes continues to defend the sovereign. He explains, “For though a
wrong sentence given by authority of the sovereign, if he know and allow it, in such laws
as are mutable, be a constitution of a new law in cases in which every little circumstance
is the same, yet in laws immutable (such as are the laws of nature) they are no laws to the
same or other judges in the like cases for ever after.”77 While the sovereign has some
leeway in regards to civil laws, he cannot legislate something that disagrees with the laws
of nature. This is understandable for the sovereign derives his power only when men
enter into a commonwealth. The sovereign, then, cannot misinterpret the law of nature
when in a commonwealth. But, the end of the commonwealth is to prevent men from
reverting to a state of nature and living under the law of nature. Thus, while it appears
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that Hobbes is limiting the rights of the sovereign, it is only because the sovereign does
not exist except in regards to the civil law.
Concluding his section “Of Civil Laws,” Hobbes details the different types of
laws and distinguishes between a law and a right. He begins, “Another division of law is
into natural and positive. Natural are those which have been laws from all
eternity…Positive are those which have not been from eternity, but have been made laws
by the will of those that have had the sovereign power.”78 Thus, civil laws are necessarily
positive laws. He divides the positive laws into two categories: the human and the divine.
And, of the human positive laws, there are those which are distributive and those which
are penal. He notes, “Distributive are those that determine the rights of the subjects,
declaring to every man what it is by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety in lands
or goods, and a right or liberty of action; and these speak to all the subjects. Penal are
those which declare what penalty shall be inflicted on those that violate the law.”79 All
these laws must be made known to the people such that they can act in accordance with
them, or otherwise face punishment. And, these laws are all enacted by the sovereign to
guide the actions of man and to preserve the peace of the commonwealth. Divine positive
laws, however, are declared by God. Hobbes explains, “Divine positive laws are those
which, being the commandments of God (not from all eternity, nor universally addressed
to all men, but only to a certain people, or to certain persons) are declared for such by
those whom God hath authorized to declare them.”80 If these laws had been addressed to
all men, they would simply be natural laws. But, instead, these laws are directed at a
specific community. The question that follows is, of course, how can one know if God
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has declared a positive law for him? Hobbes believes one cannot be sure that another has
had a revelation. But, if the law which is attributed to God’s declaration is not in conflict
with the natural law, then man should obey it (even though he may not believe it).
Finally, Hobbes defines a fundamental law and distinguishes between law and right. He
explains, “a fundamental law in every commonwealth is that which, being taken away,
the commonwealth faileth and is utterly dissolved, as a building whose foundation is
destroyed…a fundamental law is that by which subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever
power is given to the sovereign…such is the power of war and peace, of judicature, or
election of officers, and of doing whatsoever he shall think necessary for the public
good.”81 The fundamental law can be summarized as any law which is necessary for the
sustenance of the commonwealth itself. Thus, the positive laws which the sovereign
establishes must be focused on whether or not they are required for the stability of the
commonwealth. Hobbes also explains the difference between law and right. He notes,
“For right is liberty, namely that liberty which the civil law leaves us; but civil law is an
obligation, and takes from us the liberty which the law of nature gave us.”82 In a state of
nature, all men have ultimate and absolute liberty because there are no established laws.
But, in a commonwealth, the laws that are established by the sovereign, require a
restriction of this natural right and oblige men to follow the civil law. And, furthermore,
this law applies to all men in the commonwealth. Thus, the legislator can only establish
positive laws under which all subjects renounce some of their natural liberty and follow
the civil law.
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With the commonwealth established and an understanding of the civil laws
demonstrated, Hobbes turns to the ways in which the subjects can commit crimes in the
commonwealth. He begins by defining sin as follows: “A sin is not only a transgression
of a law, but also any contempt of the legislator. For such contempt is a breach of all his
laws at once.”83 Again, Hobbes hopes to protect the sovereign from the condemnation of
his subjects. Calling this behavior a sin, though, assigns to the sovereign some religious
quality. It appears, then, that Hobbes is implicitly defining the sovereign as having some
religious or divine property. A crime, which is a form of sin, is defined as, “consisting in
the committing of that which the law forbiddeth, or the omission of what is hath
commanded. So that every crime is a sin, but not every sin a crime.”84 A crime, then, is
really just the act of completing the premeditated sin. In order to have crimes or sins, a
law is necessary for, without a law, nothing can technically breach the law. Hobbes,
however, notes, “But, because the law of nature is eternal, violation of covenants,
ingratitude, arrogance and all facts contrary to any moral virtue can never cease to be
sin.”85 Thus, sin can always exist whenever one breaches the law of nature. Furthermore,
if a man claims ignorance of the law of nature, it cannot be permitted as an excuse since
his capacity for reason should have granted him access to the law. Similarly, while
ignorance of the civil law can sometimes excuse man of a crime, no one can claim to be
unaware of the existence of a sovereign. Thus, ignorance of the sovereign or of the
potential for penalty is not a valid excuse for a crime. Hobbes does offer an explanation
for the cause of crimes. He notes:
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“From defect in reasoning men are prone to violate the laws in three ways. First, by
presumption of false principles…Secondly, by false teachers, that either misinterpret the
law of nature, making it thereby repugnant to the civil law, or by teaching for laws such
doctrines of their own, or traditions of former times, as are inconsistent with the duty of a
subject. Thirdly, by erroneous inferences from true principles, which happens commonly
to men that are hasty and precipitate in concluding and resolving what to do”86
Thus, it is when men operate under an inexact reasoning that causes them to perform
crimes. In addition, passions, the possibility of riches, and the desire to rule others are
reasons men commit crimes. Ultimately, it is the inaccurate confidence in one’s own
wisdom and power that leads him to reject the current sovereign and to commit crimes.
Due to the different causes of crimes, it also follows that not all crimes are equal.
Hobbes explains, “There is a place, not only for EXCUSE, by which that which seemed a
crime is proved to be none at all, but also for EXTENUATION, by which the crime that
seemed great is made less. For though all crimes do equally deserve the name of
injustice…yet it does not follow that all crimes are equally unjust.”87 It is not the case
that all crimes are equal and, in the case of those crimes which do not have a serious
offense, it can be that the punishment be lessened or foregone completely. Hobbes
explains, “The degrees of crime are taken on divers scales, and measured, first, by the
malignity of the source or cause; secondly, by the contagion of the example; thirdly by
the mischief of the effect; and fourthly, by the concurrence of times, places, and
persons.”88 Hobbes then details several comparative hypothetical situations to
demonstrate the difference that contextual details have upon the severity of a crime. For
example, if a subject maintains a right that is inconsistent with the power of the
sovereign, then the subject should renounce his original liberty and obey the sovereign. If
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he does not follow the authority of the sovereign and proactively resists the sovereign,
then he commits a crime. Hobbes does not elaborate on what scale such a crime would
fall. But, it is clear that the disobedience of the sovereign is very serious. Thus, the most
important aspect of Hobbes’ doctrine of crimes can be traced to the definition itself. A
crime, defined, is anything that disobeys the laws of the commonwealth. As such, it is an
offense against the sovereign himself. While Hobbes permits some cases where crimes
are excused or extenuated, the disobedience of the sovereign is not one of such cases.
In contrast to the crimes that the subjects commit against the commonwealth, the
sovereign reserves the right to punish and reward his subjects based upon their behavior.
He notes, “A PUNISHMENT is an evil inflicted by public authority on him that hath
done or omitted that which is judged by the same authority to be a transgression of the
law, to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience.”89 A
punishment requires some act that violates the will of the sovereign and, as a result,
threatens the structures of the commonwealth. Hobbes then addresses the question: how
did the sovereign assume this right to punish? For, if the sovereign can punish subjects, is
that not a form of violence? And, Hobbes has previously stated that men retain the right,
even in the commonwealth, to self-preservation. He notes, “In the making of a
commonwealth, every man giveth away the right of defending another, but not of
defending himself.”90 If the end of the commonwealth is to preserve the lives of all the
subjects, which is the original incentive to enter in the commonwealth, then it is peculiar
that the sovereign should be granted the ability to punish, and thus harm, the subjects.
Hobbes argues that the sovereign derives his right to punish from the idea of the state of
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nature. He says, “before the institution of commonwealth, every man had a right to
everything, and to do whatsoever he though necessary to his own preservation….And this
is the foundation of that right of punishing which is exercised in every commonwealth.
For the subjects did not give the sovereign that right, but only (in laying down theirs)
strengthened him to use his own as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all.”91
The right to punish, then, is not a right at all. Rather, it is because each man has foregone
his right to punish all other men that the sovereign must assume this role in order to
sustain order and peace. Furthermore, Hobbes defends that the sovereign will and can
only use this right if it is meant to ensure the well-being of all. Again, it is clear that
Hobbes’ understanding of the sovereign is he whose will ultimately benefits all other men
in the commonwealth.
While Hobbes does permit the sovereign to punish his subjects in certain
circumstances, he also outlines the contexts under which punishment is not acceptable.
The following situations do not qualify as punishments: private injuries and revenges;
pain inflicted by an authority without public hearing; pain inflicted by usurped power;
pain inflicted without respect to a future good; if the pain inflicted is less than the benefit
of transgressing the law; and, hurt inflicted before the law existed. It is clear that
punishment is not the equivalent of pain, nor is it meant to be arbitrary. Rather, it is
aimed at teaching a lesson. Hobbes, again, clearly trusts the sovereign to act out of the
best interest of all men. Thus, it is expected that the sovereign will not succumb to self-
interest and punish those who merely disagree with him. But, Hobbes does argue that
those who disagree with the sovereign are actually in the wrong. So, while the sovereign
is expected to pursue the interest of all mankind, that interest simultaneously coincides
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with his own personal self-interest. Hobbes attests, “hurt inflicted on the representative of
the commonwealth is not punishment, but an act of hostility, because it is the nature of
punishment to be inflicted by public authority, which is the authority only of the
representative itself.”92 The public authority which inflicts punishment is really only the
representative himself. Furthermore, the sovereign is the one who enacts the law. As
such, he can never transgress the law, for he could just as easily change the law. The
result becomes that one can never oppose he who enacts and enforces the law, making the
sovereign immune from resistance.
After indicating what does not constitute punishment, Hobbes explains the
different types of punishment. He begins, “The first and most general distribution of
punishments is into divine and human…Human are those punishments that be inflicted
by the commandment of man, and are either corporal, or pecuniary, or ignominy, or
imprisonment, or exile.”93 Most of these definitions are obvious. It is clear that corporal
punishment signifies any injury directly inflicted upon the body. Pecuniary punishment
deprives one of some sum of money, ignominy dishonors someone, imprisonment
deprives one of his liberty, and exile is the banishment of one from a commonwealth.
Then, Hobbes details the stipulations for issuing punishments. He declares, “All
punishments of innocent subjects, be they great or little, are against the law of nature. For
punishment is only for transgression of the law; and therefore, there can be no
punishment of the innocent…For seeing all sovereign power is originally given by the
consent of every one of the subjects, to the end they should, as long as they are obedient,
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be protected thereby, the punishment of the innocent is a rendering of evil for good.”94
Thus, the sovereign is not able to punish any subject at any time. He may only punish
those men who have violated the civil law. It is unclear, however, whether Hobbes
believes the sovereign would ever injure a subject if he did not warrant it. He does affirm
that the sovereign may harm those who are not his subjects and those subjects who
explicitly rebel against the sovereign. He states, “upon this ground it is that also in
subjects who deliberately deny the authority of the commonwealth established the
vengeance is lawfully extended….because the nature of this offence consisteth in the
renouncing of subjects, which is a relapse into the condition of war, commonly called
rebellion.”95 It is Hobbes’ belief that rebellion leads to a state of war. The commonwealth
was erected to prevent such a state, and thus the sovereign is granted the power to punish
those who resist his power. Thus, the power of the sovereign must entail the right to
punish those who resist him. For, in doing so, they dissolve the commonwealth and return
to a state of war.
Hobbes then moves to describe the ways in which a commonwealth may fail.
While this section is important, especially in regard to the question of the right to rebel, it
will be better suited to a comparison of Locke’s doctrine on the conditions that warrant
resistance of the sovereign. Thus, instead of analyzing this section now, I will dedicate a
chapter to a comparison and contrast of the two doctrines on resistance, during which I
will focus on this particular section. So, to conclude the section “Of Commonwealth” in
Hobbes’ Leviathan, it will be helpful to look at the thirtieth chapter entitled, “Of the
Office of the Sovereign Representative.” He begins, “The office of the sovereign
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consisteth in the end for which he was trusted with the sovereign power, namely, the
procuration of the safety of the people, to which he is obliged by the law of nature, and to
render an account thereof to God, the author of the law, and to none but him.”96 The
sovereign, then, need not answer to anyone but God. Furthermore, the sovereign must
enjoy these rights as absolute, for if he does not do so, the result will be the dissolution of
the government. His subjects must learn that their subjection is necessary for the
continuation and stability of the state. Hobbes notes, “[the subjects] ought to be informed
how great a fault it is to speak evil of the sovereign representative, or to argue and dispute
his power, or any way to use his name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into
contempt with his people, and their obedience slackened.”97 This commentary almost
builds the sovereign up as a religious power, one who requires absolute obedience. As a
result, it appears that it is not only unlawful, but perhaps even immoral, for a man to
disregard the sovereign. And, if that is the case, then the sovereign becomes even more
empowered. In addition to being taxed with organizing the commonwealth and enacting
the laws for his subjects, the sovereign also enjoys the status of a leader whose absolute
authority cannot be questioned.
Hobbes’ “On Commonwealth” demonstrates a progressive empowering of the
role of the sovereign. On numerous occasions, Hobbes alludes to a particular religious
property of the sovereign. Furthermore, he emphasizes the absolute right of the sovereign
to enact and interpret laws. Subjects are not allowed to condemn or resist the sovereign,
except in the case of self-preservation. For Hobbes, the sovereign’s role as preserver of
the peace is most important. It is the ultimate fear of returning to a state of war that
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causes Hobbes to grant such limitless powers to the sovereign. And, it is this fear that
prevents him from condoning any sort of rebellion or resistance of the sovereign.
Hobbes’ portrayal of the sovereign as semi-divine in nature, and certainly as virtuous and
practically infallible, permits such absolute power. The subjects, who by contrast are
fallible and brutish, need this sovereign in order to survive. Without the stability and
preservation of the commonwealth, the subjects will return to a state of war and fear their
lives. Thus, the right to resist, and certainly the right to revolt or rebel, must be
compromised.
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CHAPTER III – Locke’s Second Treatise of Government
John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government was used as a justification for
revolution in the late seventeenth century. His work was to be utilized as a means by
which resistance to the sovereign could be found reasonable. It is this notion of
conditional government that made Locke’s work so infamous. His doctrine of revolution
is much stronger than that of Hobbes. For Locke, the sovereign is merely another man
who, like all others, is capable of faults. The sovereign does not enjoy absolute or
arbitrary authority and he cannot use his prerogative at all times. Furthermore, the civil
laws are not directly conformable to the will of the sovereign. Thus, Locke’s form of
government relies more heavily upon the consent of the governed. For him, the social
contract between the sovereign and his subjects is much more prone to being abused.
And, in the cases of such transgression, the people reserve the right to oppose the
sovereign without fear of punishment. Thus, in comparison to Hobbes, Locke represents
a more “subject-centric” view of the commonwealth, where the subjects sustain the
commonwealth and define the boundaries of the sovereign.
Locke begins his work by defining the foundations of civil government. He
distinguishes this type of government from the institution of the family. He notes,
“Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death, and
consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of
employing the force of the community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defence
of the common-wealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good.”98 Like
Hobbes, Locke understands political power as focusing on the public good. The
sovereign, who enjoys such political power, should ensure the stability and order of the
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political society. In particular, Locke notes that property rights are the center of much
controversy, so the sovereign must be sure to regulate those disputes. It may be asked,
then, from where does this political power come? Is it natural, or does it require the
establishment of a commonwealth in order to be enjoyed? Locke answers these questions
when he begins to formulate his version of the state of nature.
Locke, in order to establish his doctrine of political power, must first explain his
state of nature. He begins, “To understand political power right, and derive it from its
original, we must consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of
perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as
they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending
upon the will of any other man.”99 Thus, as Hobbes argued, each man is fundamentally
free in his being to do anything that conforms to the natural law. Locke continues, “A
state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having
more than the other; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same
species and rank…should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or
subjection.”100 Again, Locke continues to agree with Hobbes that men are ultimately all
equal and free. Yet, he makes one important distinction. He notes, “But though this be a
state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence…The state of nature has a law of nature to
govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind,
who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm
another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.”101 Thus, for Locke, the state of nature
is not one where all men, being equally free, constantly harm one another in pursuit of
99 Locke, p. 8
100 Locke, p. 8
101 Locke, p. 9
51
self-interest. Rather, while each man is free and equal, he must also act in such a way that
his actions do not subsequently harm another. Furthermore, each man reserves the right
to punish those who transgress the law. Locke notes, “And that all men may be restrained
from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be
observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the
law of nature is, in that state, put into every man’s hands, whereby every one has a right
to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation.”102
Thus, without a political society, there is no one who has the power to execute laws
which all must observe. Rather, the state of nature requires equity and freedom of all
men. But, without the power to punish those who violate the law of nature, there cannot
be any guarantee of peace. Locke, therefore, must grant each man the right to punish
those who transgress this law and harm others. Otherwise, we would find ourselves in
Hobbes’ state of nature, a war of all against all.
Locke, in discussing the forms of punishment, understands the difficulties posed
by allowing each man to judge the law of nature himself. If each man has the right to
punish those who transgress the law, it could be that each man would act in a way that
favors his own outcome. As a result, the state of nature could be susceptible to personal
bias. Thus, Locke notes, “I easily grant, that civil government is the proper remedy for
the inconveniences of the state of nature, which must certainly be great, where men may
be judges in their own case.”103 There must be some impartial judge that can execute the
laws without favoring one party. But, this person or sovereign cannot be deemed
infallible. Locke notes,
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“but I shall desire those who make this objection, to remember, that absolute monarchs
are but men; and if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which necessarily
follow from men’s being judge in their own cases, and the state of nature is therefore not
to be endured, I desire to know what kind of government that is, and how much better it
is than the state of nature, where one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be
judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the
liberty to any one to question or controul those who execute his please.”104
This point is one of the central differences between Locke’s concept of the state of
nature, and Hobbes’ version of the same state. Locke treats the sovereign as equal and
free, like all other men. He does not attribute to the monarch or ruler any particular
quality which makes him absolutely moral or perfect. Rather, the monarch is like all other
men. Locke notes that men can be self-interested, particularly in disputes in which they
are involved. As a result, the monarch cannot be trusted to act on behalf of the will or
good of the people should he be involved in a particular case. Thus, there remains a
particular skepticism about how perfect this commonwealth is compared to the state of
nature. Hobbes used the idea that the commonwealth prevents personal injury as a way of
justifying the absolute authority of the sovereign. But, if the state of nature is not
equivalent to a state of war, then it cannot be assumed that the state of nature is inherently
worse than the commonwealth. And, if this is so, then it is more difficult to establish that
the sovereign must enjoy absolute authority in order to sustain the commonwealth. Thus,
Locke’s concept of the monarch as a mere man, just like all other men, raises significant
and difficult questions for Hobbes’ political theory.
The next question Locke must tackle, then, regards whether people ever lived in a
state of nature. He argues, “It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever
were there any men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as an answer at
present, that since all princes and rulers or independent governments all through the
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world, are in a state of nature, it is plain the world never was, nor ever will be, without
numbers of men in that state…for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state of
nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one
community, and make one body politic.” 105 The argument, then, is based on the idea that
not all agreements we document are necessarily sufficient to dissolve the state of nature
and erect a commonwealth. He continues, “The laws which have been hitherto
mentioned…do bind men absolutely, even as they are men, although they have never any
settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do or not to
do…therefore to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us, as living single
and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with
others: this was the cause of men’s uniting themselves at first in politic societies.”106
Locke affirms that each man is born into the state of nature and, thus, it must have
existed. The only way for men to escape this state is to prefer community over isolation
and to explicitly form a commonwealth. This agreement is the foundation of political
society. Thus, it is clear within Locke’s beginning discussion of the formation of political
society that the necessary action to create such an institution is the explicit consent of the
people.
Locke, in contrast to the state of nature, offers an alternative state in which all
men do actually feud. Similar to Hobbes view, Locke entitles this the state of war. He
explains, “The state of war is a state of enmity and destruction, and therefore declaring by
word or action…a sedate settled design upon another man’s life, puts him in a state of
war with him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life
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to the other’s power to be taken away by him.”107 As Locke has previously argued, each
man has a right to his own life, liberty, and possessions. Should any man inflict pain on
another such as to compromise such rights, he would enter a state of war. Locke
continues, “one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an
enmity to his being…because such men are not under the ties of the commonlaw of
reason, have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts
of prey.”108 Thus, any man who enters a state of war immediately foregoes his
fundamental rights for he disobeys the laws of reason. The important distinction between
Locke and Hobbes on this point is that, for Locke, the state of war is not a part of the
state of nature. Hobbes believes all men naturally will impinge upon another’s rights;
Locke only believes that some men, in some occasions, will disobey the law of reason.
Locke explains, “And here we have the plain difference between the state of nature and
the state of war…Men living according to reason, without a common superior on earth,
with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature. But force, or a
declared design of force, upon the person of another, where there is no common superior
on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war.”109 Thus, the difference is reflected in
Locke’s view of the essential human nature. Men are not brutish and violent, but rather
peaceful and reasonable. It is only when someone acts irrational when the state of nature
ends and the state of war begins.
The avoiding of the state of nature is one main incentive for all men to enter into
society. Locke explains, “To avoid this state of war…is one great reason of men’s putting
themselves into society, and quitting the state of nature: for where there is an authorit, a
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power on earth, from which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state
of war is excluded, and the controversy is decided by that power.”110 It is interesting to
note that Locke’s reasoning for the beginning of society very much resembles the logic of
Hobbes. But, it should be remembered, that Locke still maintains that arbitrary power
over another is never justified. He argues, “for no body can desire to have me in his
absolute power, unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against the right of
my freedom…To be free from such force is the only security of my preservation; and
reason bids me look on him, as an enemy to my preservation, who would take away that
freedom.”111 Thus, one who uses arbitrary power over another puts himself into a state of
war with another, and therefore may be resisted by he who is threatened. He develops his
position on slavery, saying, “This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power is so necessary
to, and closely joined with a man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it…for a man,
not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave
himself to an one, nor put himself under the absolute arbitrary power of another, to take
away his life, when he pleases.”112 Each man is created by God and, as such, is not
capable of forfeiting his life. That is to say, man is the property of God and it is only He
who can decide when to sacrifice the freedom and life of the individual. As a result,
arbitrary power over another is rightfully resisted by those who are enslaved. And, it is
not surprising then that Locke will later develop a policy permitting the rebellion of the
subjects against the sovereign who goes against his will.
Locke’s position on property is, perhaps, the most significant distinction between
his social contract theory and that of Hobbes. Locke begins by understanding the world to
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be granted to men, by God, for productive use. Originally, this property is given to men
in common. But, then Locke hopes to also defend that private property may also exist in
the state of nature. He affirms, “Though the earth…be common to all men, yet every man
has a property in his own person; this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of
his body, and the work of his hands…are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out
of the state of nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and
joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”113 While
Hobbes believes that all private property in the state of nature is merely temporary, Locke
believes that labor translates the common land into private possession. This is the case,
Locke argues, because when someone adds his labor, the object is fundamentally
changed. No longer is it the natural creation of God; it is something which I have
personally labored upon and thus becomes my own. But, Locke is careful to limit such
accumulation. He defends, “The same law of nature, that does by this means give us
property, does also bound that property too. God has given us all things richly…But how
far has he given it to us? To enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any advantage
of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is
beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others.”114 Thus, the limit of the
accumulation of property depends on the proper usage of the land. A person who has a
large farm but whose crops spoil should consider forfeiting some of that land so another
can make proper use of it. Thus, Locke successfully avoids the clear objection of
excessive accumulation. While Hobbes argues that each man will inevitably consume as
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much as he can and hold this property for as long as possible, Locke believes each man
can retain as much property, naturally, as he can properly use.
Locke then takes up the concept of money. His doctrine on this both serves to
show how mutual consent can create society, as well as to show that there are particular
cases where the limits of property are overlooked. He explains that money is used so men
can exchange a perishable good for some value, agreed upon by all men in a society,
which is represented by some imperishable item. Locke explains, “if he would give his
nuts for a piece of metal….and keep those by him all his life, he invaded not the right of
others, he might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased; the exceeding of
the bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of his possession, but the
perishing of any thing uselessly in it.”115 Thus, money is used mainly as a justification for
the disproportionate allocation of goods. The other important aspect of money is that it
requires the mutual consent of all people. That is to say, the money itself does not have
an inherent value unless men believe it does. He explains, “And thus came in the use of
money, some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual
consent men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable supports of
life.”116 While money, in itself, does not provide any satisfaction, it is the perishable
things which is can purchase that gives it value. And, it is only when one is compensated
with money for this disproportionate allocation of goods that Locke can justify such a
unbalanced distribution.
Locke spends much time throughout the Treatise discussing the difference
between paternal power and civil power. His main motivation in doing so is to explain
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how it can be that absolute monarchy has been justified. Locke hopes to dissolve this
policy and to acknowledge the limitations of paternal power. He begins first by
redefining equality, saying, “Though I have said above, That all men by nature are equal,
I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality…equality I there spoke of, as
proper to the business in hand, being that equal right, that every man hath, to his natural
freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man.”117 It is
important for Locke to maintain that each man is born naturally free. While this does not
mean that all men are similar in all capacities, each man does have a right to his liberty.
Locke does admit that children are particular case. They are born subjugated to the will of
their parents, but he affirms that this is only temporary. The reason why children are
initially not totally free is because they do not have access to the law of reason. It takes
time to develop the capacity for rationality, and it is only at this point that man can fully
enjoy his freedom. Locke explains, “The power, then, that parents have over their
children, arises from that duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their off-
spring, during the imperfect state of childhood.”118 It is the duty of the parents to guide
children in the right direction until they are capable of understanding how to live
independently and in accordance with the law of reason. The power of the parent does not
reach the life or property of the child, nor is it eternal or absolute. Locke argues,
“[parental power] is but a help to the weakness and imperfection of their nonage, a
discipline necessary to their education.”119 When a child reaches an age of reason, the
relationship between a parent and child resembles that of any two men in a
commonwealth. But, children must always respect and honor their parents, for it is they
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who cared and raised the children. And, it is this obligation to honor the parents that
oftentimes leads to the father assuming an absolute monarchical role in commonwealth.
He explains, “Thus it was easy, and almost natural for children…to make way for the
father’s authority and government. They had been accustomed in their childhood to
follow his direction…It is no wonder that they made no distinction betwixt minority and
full age…and they could no where find a greater security to their peace, liberties, and
fortunes, than in the rule of the father. Thus the natural fathers of families…became the
politic monarchs of them too.”120 Locke, in distinguishing between childhood and
adulthood, aims to make sure that the people do not blindly accept a doctrine of divine
right of kings. He notes that if one traces paternal power back far enough, then all
princes should properly be priests as well. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between
paternal power and civil power in order to prevent the arbitrary will of the father being
interpreted as the natural, or civil, law.
After differentiating the two types of societies, Locke then begins his discourse on
the nature of political, or civil, society. He understands all men to be free to operate in
accordance with two natural laws. The first dictates that each man has the right to
preserve his life, liberty, and possessions against others; the second permits each man to
punish any other who transgresses the law of nature. But, this is not political society.
Locke defines civil society as, “those who are united into one body, and have a common
established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies
between them, and punish offenders.”121 Civil society must have this impartial authority
in order to succeed. Furthermore, the sovereign has a twofold power: it makes laws and it
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enforces them. Thus, each man must forfeit part of his natural right to a sovereign power
who then has the duty of protecting each subject in this society. Each man no longer
reserves the right to punish those who disobey the law; that duty now belongs to the
sovereign. Locke elaborates, “Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into
one society, as to quite every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign
it to the public, there and there only is a political or civil society.”122 By establishing a
sovereign authority to judge all disputes and to enforce the preservation of personal
property, men enter into a civil society with each other. And, it is this authority which is
supposed to resolve all the inconveniences of the state of nature.
Locke, in defining the power of the sovereign, does not permit absolute authority.
He begins, “For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and executive power in
himself alone, there is no judge to be found…whenever his property is invaded by the
will and order of his monarch, he has not only no appeal, as those in society ought to
have, but as if he were degraded from the common state of rational creatures, is denied a
liberty to judge of, or to defend his right.”123 Locke understands absolute authority to be
even worse than the state of nature. In the state of nature, each man is capable of
defending his own life, liberty, and possessions. He has the right to punish, even by
death, any one who disobeys the law of nature. Civil society is meant to secure peace and
preservation for those in society. The sovereign is supposed to be an impartial ruler who
will justly intervene in disagreements. But, if this sovereign is guaranteed absolute rights,
and is thus not subject to the civil laws, then he can act dangerously. And, Locke argues,
that this limitless power of the sovereign is even worse than the state of nature itself. This
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attack is clearly against Hobbes’ justification of the sovereign’s absolute power. Hobbes
permitted the sovereign’s authority for two reasons: first, he really didn’t think the
sovereign would transgress the law; second, even if the sovereign did something immoral
or unjust, that society would still be better than the state of nature. It is this disagreement
which will be central to each philosopher’s doctrine on the right of revolution.
After developing the civil society itself, Locke turns to a discussion of the
beginning of political societies. He begins, “Men being…by nature, all free, equal, and
independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of
another without his own consent…When any number of men have so consented to make
one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one
body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.”124 The
doctrine of consent is crucial to the understanding of Locke’s social contract theory.
Without the consent of the people, the sovereign does not hold any legitimate power.
Furthermore, it is not the arbitrary will of the sovereign who determines authority, but the
majority of the people. Locke asserts, “Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite
into a community, must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the ends for
which they unite into society, to the majority of the community, unless they expressly
agreed in any number greater than the majority.”125 Thus, without the trust of the
majority, the commonwealth will dissolve. For, unless all dissenters follow the will of the
majority, then two commonwealths will be created. And, it is the unification of civil
society which is required for the stability of commonwealth itself.
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Locke does address two objections that have been found to his theory on the
beginning of civil society. The first objection is that, historically speaking, this event of
all men living together in the state of nature suddenly uniting together and consenting to
follow a specific ruler has never actually happened. The second objection is that, since
each man is born under the rule of a specific government, it cannot be the case that he can
consent to follow a different ruler. Locke attacks this first argument by noting great
societies, such as Rome and Venice, stating that they did, in fact, arise from the common
consent of all men. He affirms, “these [peoples of America]…were actually free…by
consent were all equal…So that their politic societies all began from voluntary union, and
the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice of their governors, and forms of
government.”126 Locke believes it quite clear that the examples of history have shown
that governments do, indeed, arise from the voluntary consent of the people. He then
addresses the issue of monarchical power. It would seem that the structure of a monarchy
would include absolute authority, thus rendering Locke’s doctrine of consent futile. But,
Locke defends that this type of government follows naturally. He argues, “First then…the
father’s government of the childhood of those sprung from him…it was sufficient to
procure and preserve to men all that political happiness they sought for in society. It was
no wonder they should pitch upon, and naturally run into that form of government…the
monarchy being simple, and most obvious to men.”127 Since children are accustomed to
the rule of the father, it is understandable that the power would be invested in such a
figure when political society began. Furthermore, none had experienced this father as a
tyrannical power, making his sole authority more appealing. Thus, Locke logically
126 Locke, p. 55
127 Locke, p. 57
63
explains why it came to be that the structure of inherited monarchy began. But, this type
of limitless power was only permitted because no previous king had overstepped his
bounds. Locke notes, “But though that golden age…had more virtue…when ambition
and luxury in future ages would retain and increase the power, without doing the business
for which it was given…men found it necessary to examine more carefully the original
and rights of government, and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitances and prevent
the abuses of that power.”128 While the original ruling fathers did not act out of self-
interest, it is the recent breed of rulers that have extended their prerogative. And, it is
such abuses that have changed the expectations, and limitations, of the sovereign power.
Thus, for Locke, it is not that monarchy itself has always been inherently bad, but rather
that the societal changes have perverted this type of government such that it can no
longer enjoy the same limitless powers it once had.
The second objection Locke must overcome is the idea that all men are actually
born as subjects to a specific society and, thus, have no right to choose a new
commonwealth. Locke begins his rebuttal by noting, “I ask, how came so many lawful
monarchies into the world? for if any body, upon this supposition, can shew me any one
man in any age of the world free to begin a lawful monarchy, I will be bound to shew him
ten other free men at liberty, at the same time to unite and begin a new government under
a regal, or any other form.”129 If all men are bound to a specific society, how could it be
that there exist so many different monarchies? For, in the beginning, there was one
society and I am bound to that society, and so are all my children, then should it not also
be that all other men are also bound to that law? If that is not the case, then why is it that
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I am not free, but some other men enjoy such liberty? Locke continues, “it being
demonstration, that if any one, born under the dominion of another, may be so free as to
have a right to command others in a new and distinct empire, every one that is born under
the dominion of another may be so free too, and may become a ruler, or subject, of a
distinct separate government.”130 Because Locke believes all men to be both free and
equal, it cannot be that some members of a society enjoy certain rights while others do
not. Thus, if one is to explain the existence of multiple societies, then it must be because,
at some point, one man left the original society to create his own. And, if he had the right
to do so, then all other men must also have this right. While one might defend that each
child is subject to the will of his father, Locke rejects this claim saying, “for his son,
when a man, being altogether free as the father, any act of the father can no more give
away the liberty of the son.”131 Each person, therefore, reserves the right to join any
society he sees fit. It is only the person’s consent which necessarily attaches him to a
specific society.
Now, the question still remains, what exactly Locke understands as sufficient
consent. He begins, “There is a common distinction of an express and a tacit
consent…No body doubts but an express consent, of any man entering into any society,
makes him a perfect member of that society…The difficulty is, what ought to be looked
upon as a tacit consent, and how far it binds…And to this I say, that every man, that hath
any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government, doth
thereby give his tacit consent.”132 Tacit consent, then, depends on the subject enjoying the
protections and services of the government. This tacit consent is temporary; whenever
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one forfeits these protections from the government he is free to join another society.
Express consent, however, is eternal unless the government is dissolved. Locke concludes
his chapter, “Of the Beginnings of Political Society and Government,” by clarifying his
doctrine on consent. He explains, “But submitting to the laws of any country, living
quietly, and enjoying privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a member of
that society…Nothing can make any man so, but his actually entering into it by positive
engagement, and express promise and compact. This is that, which I think, concerning
the beginning of political societies, and that consent which many any one a member of
any commonwealth.”133 It is not, then, that tacit consent can make you a member of
society. It must be an express consent, for an extended period of time, which qualifies as
the true beginning of any political society.
After discussing the beginnings of political society, Locke turns to the ultimate
ends, or goals, civil society must pursue. He begins with the question of why, in any case,
one would depart from the ultimate state of freedom. He understands that in the state of
nature there is some risk of being exposed to the danger of others. Locke affirms, “it is
not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are
already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives,
liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name of property.”134 The end of the
commonwealth is the preservation of peace and property. Locke understands three
conditions to be a necessary part of this state. He explains, “First, There wants an
established, settled known law…Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and
indifferent judge…Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back and
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support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution.”135 The set up of the
commonwealth requires each of these conditions in order to be effective. It is interesting
to note the difference between Hobbes’ view on the beginnings of society and Locke’s
opinion on the same action. Hobbes believes the ultimate beginning of society depends
on the mutual fear each man has of all other men. And, Hobbes believes society is created
to ensure the preservation of each man’s life. Locke, who also recognizes the importance
of fear, goes a step further. He argues that the ultimate end of society is to ensure the
preservation of not only each man’s life, but also of his property. Thus, Locke concludes,
“And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any common-wealth, is bound
to govern…to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.”136
Locke’s commonwealth depends on a structure which separates the executive and
the legislative powers. Unlike Hobbes, no one person or institution is given all the power.
Locke’s main distinction is between the legislative and executive powers. He explains,
“The great end of men’s entering into society, being the enjoyment of their properties in
peace and safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws establish in
that society; the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the
establishing of the legislative power.”137 After establishing this power, though, it is
unclear to what extent Locke permits the legislative to rule. He recognizes that the
legislative should have supreme power, and he emphasizes, “all the obedience, which by
the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this supreme
power, and is directed by those laws which it enacts.”138 Thus, it appears that Locke is
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favoring a Hobbesian view of the sovereign, in that he grants him such supreme power.
But, Locke quickly qualifies his statement. He notes, “it is not, nor can possibly be
absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint
power of every member of the society given up to that person, or assembly, which is
legislator; it can be no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they
entered into society.”139 Because no person had the right to injure or invade another’s life
or property in the state of nature, it is impossible for the sovereign to exercise an arbitrary
right to another’s life or possessions. The sovereign can only act in accordance with the
public good, and thus cannot pursue private interests that injure others. Along these same
lines, Locke continues, “The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot assume to itself a
power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice, and
decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws, and known authorized
judges.”140 The sovereign, thus cannot arbitrarily decree laws. Unlike Hobbes, the laws
are not derived from the will of the sovereign. Rather, the laws are independently created
by the legislative and must be known to the people. And, there must be independent,
unbiased judges to interpret and exact the laws. The sovereign also cannot take the
property of any man without his consent. Locke explains, “for the preservation of
property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it
necessarily supposes and requires, that the people should have property…they have such
a right to the goods, which by the law of the community are their’s, that no body hath a
right to take their substance or any part of it from them, without their consent.” Civil
society is meant to ensure the preservation of property of all individuals. Thus, the
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sovereign cannot just arbitrarily take the property of his subjects. Locke continues to
defend the idea that the sovereign is still a member of the society, and must act in
accordance with the civil laws. Finally, the sovereign may not transfer the power
entrusted to him to any other. The majority sacrificed its natural right to a specific
sovereign, and thus it is not up to him who receives that power. Locke clarifies, “The
power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and
institution, can be no other than what that positive grant conveyed, which being only to
make laws, and not make legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their
authority of making laws, and place it in other hands.” 141 Thus, Locke establishes a fairly
substantive sovereign power, but still maintains that this supreme power must be
qualified to ensure that it does not become an arbitrary power.
With the legislative and executive powers qualified, Locke turns to defining the
three branches of government he sees suitable for the commonwealth. He explains, “The
legislative power is that, which has a right to direct how the force of the common-wealth
shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it…it is necessary
there should be a power….which should see to the execution of the laws that are made,
and remain in force. And thus the legislative and executive power come often to be
separated…There is another power in every common-wealth…Hence it is, that the
controversies that happen between any man of the society with those that are outside of it,
are managed by the public…and may be called the federative.”142 Thus, the three powers
are charged with making laws, enforcing these laws, and settling disputes over the laws,
especially in regard to foreign powers. Locke does believe that the executive and
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federative powers should be consolidated into one person. He notes, “Though…the
executive and federative power of every community be really distinct in themselves, yet
they are hardly to be separated, and placed at the same time, in the hands of distinct
persons: for both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is almost
impracticable to place the force of the common-wealth in distinct, and not subordinate
hands.”143 While the executive and federative roles are distinct, particularly in their
treatment of domestic versus foreign affairs, Locke believes it practical for the two
powers to be consolidated into one being. Yet, it is important to remember that this
seemingly robust power cannot be misconstrued as purely arbitrary.
Locke, once he has determined the three different powers which constitute a civil
society, turns to discuss the subordination of these powers. It is here that he openly and
emphatically supports the idea of the peoples’ right to revolt. He begins, “there remains
still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find the
legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them: for all power given with trust for the
attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected, or
opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the power devolve into the hands of
those that gave it, who may place it anew where they shall think best for their safety and
security.”144 While it does not appear that Locke has a bloody or violent revolution is
mind, he clearly does not portray the sovereign as an infallible figure. Hobbes justified
the absolute authority of the sovereign by noting the terrifying state of nature. But, for
Locke, this absolute power can never justly become arbitrary. He continues, “And thus
the community perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the
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attempts and designs of any body, even of their legislators, whenever they shall be so
foolish, or so wicked, as to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of
the subject.”145 No one can neglect his personal right to self-preservation. Men enter into
community in order to establish peace and to ensure the preservation of property. But, if
the sovereign transgresses the law and starts acting out of private interests, then the
people reserve the right to reject the sovereign and to establish a new legislative power.
Locke, who to this point has been opposed to arbitrary power, permits the
executive power the right to prerogative. While he still maintains a doctrine against the
use of arbitrary power, he does understand that the civil laws may not be applicable to all
situations. And, it is in these types of contexts, that the executive must use his best
judgment to pursue the public good. He explains, “Many things there are, which the law
can by no means provide for; and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him
that has the executive power in his hands, to be ordered by him as the public good and
advantage shall require.”146 This does provide some complications. If Locke trusts that
the executive will act in accordance with the public good when no law dictates explicitly
the action to take, then why can he not also be permitted to dictate the specific laws at all
times? Furthermore, how can one prevent the sovereign from assuming the public good to
be his own private interest? Locke attempts to answer this question by saying, “if there
comes to be a question between the executive power and the people, about a thing
claimed as prerogative; the tendency of the exercise of such prerogative to the good or
hurt of the people, will easily decide that question.”147 Thus, Locke still permits the
people to be the final judge in questions regarding the excessive and arbitrary use of
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authority. He continues, “prerogative can be nothing but the people’s permitting their
rulers to do several things, of their own free choice, where the law was silent, and
sometimes too against the direct letter of the law, for the public good.”148 Locke, as can
be predicted, maintains that the use of prerogative depends upon the consent of the
people. Finally, Locke poses the question of who can determine whether an executive or
legislative is depriving any one of his property or rights. Locke defends that each man is
born free and thus cannot be enslaved by another. As such, if a legislative or executive
power infringes upon a man’s natural right, he may resist them. While Locke argues that
men may not decide if a legislative or executive oversteps his bounds, all men reserve the
right to defend themselves.
It may be said that the alternative method of establishing a civil society is through
conquest of another people. Locke explains that this does not, in fact, constitute a
commonwealth. He begins, “the aggressor, who puts himself into the state of war with
another, and unjustly invades another man’s right, can, by such an unjust war, never
come to have a right over the conquered.”149 Again, it is clear that the consent of the
majority is required to establish any sort of political society. Locke does permit the victor
in a lawful war to retain some dominion over his enemies. He only retains a right over
those who actually resisted him in the war itself, and this power is despotical. He explains
the conqueror, “has an absolute power over the lives of those, who, by putting themselves
in a state of war, have forfeited them; but he has not thereby a right and title to their
possessions.”150 It is quite peculiar that Locke would permit the conqueror to have total
rights over another’s life, but not over his property. This doctrine is strange especially
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since Locke has advocated that no man can sacrifice his own life, and therefore may not
give his life to another. He defends this new position, however, by noting that the
aggressor initiated a state of war with the conqueror, and thus this right to the captive’s
life is permitted. But, this right to another’s life is only permitted if it regards those who
participated in the aggression and if the war itself was just. Locke concludes his chapter
on conquest by noting that rebellion against an unjust conqueror is allowed. He notes,
“Whence it is plain, that shaking off a power, which force, and not right, hath set over
any one, though it hath the name of rebellion, yet is no offence before God, but is that
which he allows and countenances, though even promises and covenants, when obtained
by force.”151 Thus, the conqueror does not enjoy quite as many rights as he who rules by
consent. And, his power is limited only to those who actually fought against him.
In contrast to foreign conquest, Locke does not believe domestic usurpation is
ever justified. He notes, “usurpation is a kind of domestic conquest…[but] an usurper can
never have right on his side.”152 Because the original freedoms of the people are divested
and given up to a specific sovereign, it can never be that a person can simply, without the
consent of the people, take over this power. He elaborates, “Nor can such an usurper, or
any deriving from him, ever have a title, till the people are both at liberty to consent, and
have actually consented to allow, and confirm in him the power he hat till then
usurped.”153 Again, it is clear that legitimate government depends upon the people. In
addition to the violation of usurpation, Locke also addresses tyranny. He explains, “As
usurpation is the exercise of power, which another hath a right to; so tyranny is the
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exercise of power beyond right.”154 Thus, tyranny can be deemed this absolute and
arbitrary power Locke has continuously been wary of. This tyrannical power is not only
an error committed by monarchies. Rather, Locke explains, “Where-ever law ends,
tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another’s harm; and whosoever in authority
exceeds the power given him by the law…may be opposed, as any other man, who by
force invades the right of another.”155 There is a particular level of trust that the subject
grants the sovereign, and should he break this sort of agreement, then he forfeits this
power. Locke does ask if the sovereign may be opposed, to which he affirms, “force is to
be opposed to nothing, but to unjust and unlawful force.”156 Thus, the subjects may not
simply rebel against the authority for each petty grievance. They are only permitted to
use force against the sovereign if he commits an act against them that involves unlawful
or unjust force. He rejects the doctrine of infallibility of the sovereign, saying, “this
privilege, belonging only to the king’s person, hinders not, but they may be questioned,
opposed, and resisted, who use unjust force.”157 Thus, he maintains that unjust force is
never permitted, and may be resisted. But, the resistance often takes the form of an appeal
to the law, and thus each resistance does not ultimately dissolve the government. Locke
emphasizes this point to prevent the objection that his doctrine leads to utter anarchy and
disorder. It is only when the majority are offended by a severe and unjust action that the
dissolution of the government can occur. Thus, the tyrannical powers must necessarily be
resisted for it is consent, and only consent, that can legitimize a government. And, when
this power is abused on a large scale, a full revolution may occur.
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Locke’s position differs significantly from that of Hobbes. Not only does he have
a much more positive notion of the natural state of human beings, he is also much more
wary of the actions of the sovereign. He begins by noting that all men are born free and
with the capacity to ultimately operate under the natural law of reason. Furthermore, each
man has the right to punish anyone who transgresses this law of nature. And, each man
can enjoy private property in the state of nature. Thus, Locke portrays men as much less
violent and inconstant as Hobbes. In regards to his theory of the commonwealth, Locke
does try to provide some historical examples. He believes, similar to Hobbes, that there is
a contract created by all men to sacrifice some of their natural rights in order to preserve
and regulate individual property, including life, liberty, and possessions. But, it is
Locke’s idea of the sovereign which differs most strongly from Hobbes’ theory. While
the legislative power is supreme in his commonwealth, he does not permit either the
legislative or executive access to arbitrary power. Hobbes argued that the sovereign’s will
was necessarily good and, thus, he could not be resisted. The sovereign, for Hobbes,
always acted in a way that was in accordance with the public good. Locke is much more
skeptical of the sovereign power. On numerous occasions, he emphasizes that the
sovereign is merely another man, who is subject to the same faults as all other men. Thus,
he cannot be trusted to always act in line with the public good. Thus, the legitimacy of
government depends upon the people’s consent. Hobbes argues that resistance from the
people will only result in a reverting to the state of nature. And, for Hobbes, the state of
nature and the state of war are equivalent. But, it is Locke’s distinction between these two
states, as well as his recognition of the fallibility of the sovereign, which permits him to
place the ultimate power in the hands of the people.
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CHAPTER IV – The Right of Revolution
The social contract theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke differ greatly on
the subject of the right of revolution. As has been discussed in previous chapters, Hobbes
would prefer a sovereign who exacts arbitrary and inhumane punishments before he
permits the subjects any right of revolution. This doctrine stems from Hobbes’ own
portrayal of the sovereign as sacred and infallible. Locke, on the other hand, believes the
sovereign is merely just another man who is entrusted with the power to rule the
commonwealth. But, it is important to note that this trust depends heavily upon the
consent of the people. Thus, it is never acceptable for a sovereign to exercise arbitrary
power. Furthermore, Locke separates the powers of government between the legislative,
executive, and federative in an attempt to prevent power from accumulating too much in
the hands of one person. Thus, the significant difference between the two social contract
theories depends on how each philosopher portrays the nature of the sovereign. And, it is
this difference in portrayal that ultimately leads to the permitting, or non-permitting, of a
right of revolution.
Hobbes discusses his doctrine on the right of revolution in his chapter entitled,
“Of those things that Weaken or tend to the Dissolution of a Commonwealth.” He begins
by outlining some principles by which a commonwealth may prevent itself from
dissolution. His first principle, the want of absolute power, is justified as necessary
because it allows the sovereign to use any means in order to ensure the stability of the
commonwealth. He notes it is a fault, “that a man, to obtain a kingdom, is sometimes
content with less power than to the peace and defence of the commonwealth is
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necessarily required.”158 With checks on the power of the sovereign, the peace and
security of the commonwealth cannot be guaranteed. He furthers his argument by noting
that private parties may not be the judges of matters of good and evil. He notes, “I
observe the diseases of a commonwealth that proceed from the poison of seditious
doctrines, whereof one is: That every private men is judge of good and evil actions. This
is true in the condition of mere nature…But otherwise, it is manifest that the measure of
good and evil actions is the civil laws, and the judge the legislator, who is always
representative of the commonwealth.”159 Thus, it is clear that Hobbes contends that the
sovereign is infallible, that his judgments are established as the civil laws, and that his
commands should be obeyed.
Hobbes also rejects the claim that the sovereign should be subject to the civil
laws. He explains, “A fourth opinion repugnant to the nature of a commonwealth is this:
That he that hath the sovereign power is subject to civil laws. It is true that sovereigns are
all subjects to the laws of nature…But to those laws which the sovereign himself, that is,
which the commonwealth maketh, he is not subject. For to be subject to laws is to be
subject to the commonwealth, that is, to the sovereign representative, that is, to himself,
which is not subjection, but freedom from the laws.”160 Hobbes explicitly notes that being
subject to the commonwealth is being subject to the sovereign himself. Furthermore, the
laws of commonwealth are created by him. As such, to subject himself to his own laws is
redundant, and Hobbes just permits the sovereign to be free the civil laws. But, this is a
dangerous move since it allows the sovereign to use his will without any limitations. It is
easy to see how absolute, arbitrary power can be extrapolated from Hobbes’ theory. He
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continues to bolster the power of the sovereign when he permits him to usurp the
property of his subjects. Hobbes notes, “A fifth doctrine that tendeth to the dissolution of
a commonwealth is That every private man has an absolute propriety in his goods, such
as excludeth the right of the sovereign. Every man has indeed a propriety that excludes
the right of every other subject; and he has it only from the sovereign power…But if the
right of the sovereign also be excluded, he cannot perform the office they have put him
into, which is to defend them both from foreign enemies and from the injuries of one
another.”161 While Hobbes portrays this right as necessary to the benefit of the subjects, it
is still disconcerting. If the sovereign has access to his subjects’ property at all times, and
he is not subject to the civil laws, then there appears to be little protection from the will
of the sovereign. Hobbes does not develop the idea that the sovereign could be potentially
dangerous with so much power. He justifies this absolute power by arguing that the state
of nature is, ultimately, much worse than the arbitrary will of the sovereign. And, as a
result, the lesser evil should be preferred. Still, if this sovereign is a mere mortal man, it
should be expected that he will abuse his newfound power. And, while the state of nature
is nasty and brutish, all men are subject to the same treatment. By exempting one person,
the sovereign, from the civil laws, he enjoys preferential treatment, all while establishing
his own person will as the rule of the commonwealth.
Another point which worries Hobbes is when the power of the sovereign is
divided. He begins, “There is a sixth doctrine plainly and directly against the essence of a
commonwealth, and it is this: That the sovereign power may be divided. For what is it to
divide the power of a commonwealth, but to dissolve it; for powers divided mutually
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destroy each other.”162 Again, Hobbes hopes to ensure that the power of the sovereign is
unwavering. Hobbes even opposes a separation of powers into an ecclesiastical and
temporal power. He elaborates, “seeing it is manifest that the civil power and the power
of the commonwealth is the same thing, and that the supremacy, and the power of making
canons and granting faculties, implieth a commonwealth, it followeth that where one can
make laws and another make canons, there must needs be two commonwealths…which is
a kingdom divided.”163 If men are to follow two separate, and potentially opposing,
doctrines of how to live, it is impossible for a cohesive kingdom to remain. He continues,
“When, therefore, these two powers oppose one another, the commonwealth cannot but
be in great danger of civil war and dissolution.”164 In addition to a separation between
earthly and spiritual powers, Hobbes warns against a mixed government. This model is
similar to the separation of powers which Locke recommends. He notes, “this
endangereth the commonwealth...the truth is that it is not one independent
commonwealth, but three independent factions.”165 If each faction is granted absolute
power, which Hobbes has argued the sovereign must have, then there must necessarily be
three separate factions. Thus, Hobbes affirms that the sovereign power must be contained
in one institution, or person, in order to be used appropriately.
Hobbes concludes that it is not permissible for the subjects to dispute against the
sovereign. He notes, “the liberty of disputing against absolute power by pretenders to
political prudence, which, though bred for the most part in the lees of the people, yet
animated by false doctrines, are perpetually meddling with the fundamental laws, to the
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molestation of the commonwealth.”166 Thus, it does not appear that subjects can ever be
justified in disobeying the will of the sovereign. Hobbes then indicates that a
commonwealth is ultimately dissolved when a foreign power takes over. He explains,
“when in a war…the enemies get a final victory…there is no farther protection of
subjects in their loyalty, then is the commonwealth dissolved, and every man at liberty to
protect himself by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest onto him. For the
sovereign is the public soul, giving life and motion to the commonwealth, which
expiring, the members are governed by it no more…For though the right of a sovereign
monarch cannot be extinguished by the act of another, yet the obligation of the members
may.”167 The subjects are only permitted to disobey the sovereign when his power is
dissolved. But, this dissolution does not come from the will of the people themselves.
Rather, it is an external act, such as conquest, which suppresses the rule of the sovereign,
rendering him unable to protect the people from outside threats. Because the end of the
commonwealth is the preservation of the lives of men, and because the sovereign can no
longer provide that protection, the people are free to return to a state of nature. Thus, it is
never the willful act of revolution which is permitted. Rather, the dissolution of the
sovereign can only come from external circumstances. And, as such, the sovereign can
rightfully suppress any act of revolution his subjects commit. Thus, because Hobbes
views the sovereign as infallible and sacred, he does not permit the subjects any right of
revolution against their leader. Any act of revolution would immediately dissolve the
commonwealth and revert back to a state of nature. And, it is Hobbes’ ultimate goal to
prevent men from re-entering the state of nature ever again.
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While Hobbes is reluctant to permit any sort of right of revolution, Locke
develops a different view. In his chapter entitled, “Of the Dissolution of Government,” he
outlines his argument why he believes that man has a right to dissolve an illegitimate
form of government. He begins with a distinction between the dissolution of society and
that of government. He states, “Whenever the society is dissolved, it is certain the
government of that society cannot remain…The usual, and almost only way whereby this
union is dissolved, is the inroad of foreign force.”168 Thus, if a society succumbs to the
force of another, the government must necessarily also be dissolved. But, Locke notes
that governments may also be dissolved from within. He notes several ways in which this
might occur. The first cause is when the legislative is altered. He explains, “it is in the
legislative, that the members of a commonwealth are united…therefore, when the
legislative is broken, or dissolved, dissolution and death follows: for the essence and
union of the society consisting in having one will, the legislative, when once established
by the majority, has the declaring, and as it were keeping of that will.”169 The legislative,
in Locke’s political theory, rules by the will of the people. And, it is the will of the people
which is central to the operations of the commonwealth. Without this legislative, then,
there can be no successful government. He continues, “When any one…shall take upon
them to make laws, whom the people have not appointed so to do, they make laws
without authority, which the people are not therefore bound to obey; by which means
they come again to be out of subjection, and may constitute themselves a new
legislative.”170 Locke’s theory of the commonwealth rests heavily upon the ideas of
consent and legitimacy. Without these concepts, government becomes arbitrary. The
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sovereign, or the legislative, may not act without being endowed by the will of the
people. As a result, the people are capable of dissolving, and replacing, any form of
government which does not appear legitimate. Of course, the question becomes, is there
an objective system by which to evaluate such a claim?
There are several ways by which the legislative may be altered. Locke initially
lists the variety of violations that can be committed by a prince:
“First, That when such a single person, or prince, sets up his own arbitrary will in place
of the laws, which are the will of the society, declared by the legislative, then the
legislative is changed…Secondly, When the prince hinders the legislative from
assembling in its due time, or from acting freely, pursuant to those ends for which it was
constituted, the legislative is altered…Thirdly, When by the arbitrary power of the prince,
the electors, or ways of election, are altered, without the consent, and contrary to the
common interest of the people, there also the legislative is altered…Fourthly, The
delivery also of the people into the subjection of a foreign power, either by the prince, or
by the legislative, is certainly a change of the legislative, and so a dissolution of the
government.”171
It is clear that Locke does not condone the arbitrary will of the executive power. If he
uses his power to repress the will of the people, then he ultimately dissolves the
commonwealth. Again, the consent of the people is crucial to Locke’s understanding of
government. He continues, “There is one way more whereby such a government may be
dissolved, and that is, when he who has the supreme executive power, neglects and
abandons that charge, so that laws already made can no longer be put in
execution…Where the laws cannot be executed, it is all one as if there were no laws.”172
Thus, it is clear that whenever the sovereign oversteps his bounds, or does not perform
his duties satisfactorily, then the government is dissolved and, ultimately, replaced. He
notes, “when the government is dissolved, the people are at liberty to provide for
themselves, by erecting a new legislative, differing from the other, by the change of
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persons, or form, or both, as they shall find it most for their safety and good.”173 The
people, then, retain the ultimate right to determine the establishment of government.
Again, it is consent that ultimately determines the form, stability, and structure of
government.
The second way a legislative may be altered is when the legislative acts such that
the people begin to mistrust the government institution. Locke argues, “the society can
never, by the fault of another, lose the native and original right it has to preserve itself,
which can only be done by a settled legislative, and a fair and impartial execution of the
laws made by it. But the state of mankind is not so miserable that they are not capable of
using this remedy.”174 This appears to be a direct retort to the argument made by Hobbes.
Locke, from the beginning, advocated that men, in their natural form, exist as free beings.
They do not interact in a brutish or aggressive manner. Thus, men do not have to accept
the arbitrary will of their government just because they fear returning to the state of
nature. Thus, Locke rejects Hobbes’ argument that absolute authority, even though It may
be wrong, must be obeyed nonetheless. Locke explains, “First, The legislative acts
against the trust reposed in them, when they endeavour to invade the property of the
subject, and to make themselves…arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of
the people…whenever the legislators endeavour to take away, and destroy the property of
the people…they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon
absolved from any farther obedience.”175 For Locke, it does not matter if the executive or
the legislative commits the crime. Whenever arbitrary power is used, the people are
permitted to revolt.
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It may be objected that Locke’s policy permits endless rebellion. Without an
objective rubric by which to evaluate the actions of the government, it would appear that
the subjective interpretation of the acts of the legislative or executive could permit
endless revolution. Locke notes, “perhaps it will be said…no government will be able
long to subsist, if they people may set up a new legislative, whenever they take offence to
the old one. To this I answer…People are not so easily got out of their old forms…This
slowness and aversion in the people to quit their old constitutions, has, in the many
revolutions which have been seen in this kingdom…still brought us back again to our old
legislative.”176 Locke does not believe men care to simply revolt for the sake of it. Rather,
there needs to be some strong incentive for the people to make any drastic change in the
form of government. He continues, “revolutions happen not upon every little
mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and
inconvenient laws, and all the slips of the human frailty, will be born by the people
without mutiny of murmur. But if a long train of abuses, prevarications and artifices, all
tending the same way…it is not to be wondered, that they should then rouze themselves,
and endeavour to put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for
which government was at first erected.”177 It is Locke’s belief that men do not just uproot
the foundations of government because of occasional disappointments or inconveniences.
Rather, it is the excessive use of arbitrary power and the repeated violations of trust that
result in revolution. And, for Locke, such revolution is justified.
Locke, in perhaps his strongest argument for the right of revolution, claims that
the actual rebel is the sovereign who violates the social contract. He notes:
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“this doctrine of a power in the people of providing for their safety a-new, by a new
legislative, when their legislators have acted contrary to their trust…is the best fence
against rebellion…for if any one by force takes away the established legislative of any
society…he thereby taks away the umpirage, which every one had consented to…They,
who remove, or change the legislative, take away this decisive power, which no body can
have, but by the appointment and consent of the people; and so destroying the authority
which the people did, and no body else can set up, and introducing a power which the
people hath not authorized, they actually introduce a state of war, which is that of force
without authority…And if those, who by force take away the legislative, are rebels, the
legislators themselves, as has been shewn, can be no less esteemed so; when they, who
were set up for the protection, and preservation of the people, their liberties and
properties, shall by force invade and endeavour to take them away; and so they putting
themselves into a state of war with those who made them the protectors and guardians of
their peace, are properly, and with the greatest aggravation…rebels.”178
For Locke, the real rebels are the legislators who transgress the laws, which they made, in
order to harm the people. The aim of civil society is the preservation of property and the
security of the people. But, if the sovereign rejects such laws and does not perform his
duties, then he is the one who dissolves the structures of the society and re-establishes the
state of war. And, thus, the people, who again seek peace, may consent to operate under a
new legislative that is endowed with the responsibilities of ensuring the peace and
security of the people.
Locke understands men to be born both equal and free. Furthermore, he does not
believe any man has a right to take the property or life of another. This idea is bolstered
when Locke attempts to develop a policy of self-defense. The people are granted a right
to protect their own interests because, after all, the civil society was originally established
to guarantee the protection of certain rights. He notes, “Whosoever uses force without
right, as every one does in society, who does it without law, puts himself into a state of
war with those against whom he so uses it; and in that state all former ties are cancelled,
all other rights cease, and every one has a right to defend himself, and to resist the
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aggressor.”179 He cites Barclay as an example of someone who would normally defend
the arbitrary rights of kings, but who also recognizes a right of the people. He explains,
“if the king…sets himself against the body of the common-wealth…in this case the
people have a right to resist and defend themselves from injury.”180 Barclay limits this
form of self-defense as only against acts currently committed. The people may not use
force as a form of justice for past crimes. Furthermore, they may only do so in a dignified
manner. Locke mocks these limitations, for it seems implausible for one to resist without
force against the king. Furthermore, Barclay protects the king because he is “superior” to
his subjects. Of course, Locke rejects this notion, for when arbitrary power is used, the
people return to a state of war. And, it is when they return to that state that all men are
naturally equal. The only conditions under which a man may strike a king, for Barclay,
are when the king forfeits his role as king altogether. He explains, “If he endeavour to
overturn the government, that is if he have a purpose and design to ruin the kingdom and
commonwealth… he immediately gives up all care and thought of the common-wealth,
and consequently forfeits the power of governing his subjects…The other case is, When a
king makes himself the dependent of another…and so by this act sets the people free, and
leaves them at their own disposal.”181 Thus, the sovereign may only be resisted when he
no longer remains the sovereign. While Barclay provides different arguments for why a
king may lose his power, it is still this notion that when the sovereign breaches the trust
of the people, or forfeits his power in some other way, then he no longer has dominion
over the people. And, without this power, he may be resisted.
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The issue with Locke’s doctrine, thus far, is that he does not explicitly detail how
the efforts of the legislative or executive will be evaluated. While he addresses the
problem of frequent rebellion, there is no reference to an objective assessment of the civil
society. In the conclusion of his chapter on the dissolution of government, he asserts that
the people are, ultimately, the judge. He notes, “Who shall be judge, whether the prince
or legislative act contrary to their trust?...To this I reply, The people shall be judge; for
who shall be judge whether his trustee or deputy acts well, and according to the trust
reposed in him, but he who deputes him, and must, by having deputed him, have still a
power to discard him, when he fails his trust?”182 Since the sovereign has no power
without the consent of the people, he cannot have any more rights than those with which
the people endow him. And, because Locke already argued that man may not, in any
circumstances, will his own maltreatment, the sovereign may not enjoy such a power.
Furthermore, because the people endow him with these powers, they must always reserve
the right to replace him. He continues, “this question…cannot mean, that there is no
judge at all…every man is judge for himself…If a controversy arise betwixt a prince and
some of the people…I should think the proper umpire…should be the body of the
people.”183 Locke’s position, it is clear, differs greatly from that of Hobbes. While
Hobbes would have advocated that the sovereign be judge in all cases, it is the people, for
Locke, who ultimately decide in areas of disagreement. And, this difference results
greatly from the differing interpretations each has of the role, and nature, of the
sovereign.
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Locke concludes his section on revolution by asserting that while the civil society
is still established, the individuals do not retain their rights. He explains, “The power that
every individual gave the society, when he entered into it, can never revert to the
individuals again, as long as the society lasts, but will always remain in the
community…so also when the society hath placed the legislative in any assembly of men,
to continue in them and their successors…the legislative can never revert to the people
whilst that government lasts.”184 It appears that Locke is qualifying his statements and
permitting the legislative eternal power. But, it is important to note that this power is only
legitimate when the government lasts. He explains, “But if [the people] have set limits to
the duration of the legislative, and made this supreme power in any person, or assembly,
only temporary; or else, when by the miscarriages of those in authority, it is forfeited;
upon the forfeiture, or at the determination of the time set, it reverts to the society, and
the people have a right to act as supreme, and continue the legislative in themselves; or
erect a new form, or under the old form place it in new hands, as they think good.”185
Thus, if the government is ended, for reasons such as a transgression of the law or the use
of arbitrary power, then the people retain a right to replace the form of government. That
is to say, if the sovereign rebels against the original social contract, he returns the people
to a state of war. He forfeits his power over them, and they can then “revolt” and
establish either a new form of government or a new person as sovereign. Thus, the
people’s consent is necessary to the stability and security of government, and it is the
people who ultimately control the status, and form, of the civil society.
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Hobbes and Locke offer two very distinct views on the right of revolution. For
Hobbes, the people may not revolt against the sovereign. He regards such an act to be not
only disrespectful to an authority figure, but also short-sighted. If one dissolves the
commonwealth, then all return to a state of nature. And, for Hobbes, this translates into a
state of war. Locke, on the other hand, permits a much stronger and substantive form of
the right of revolution. He understands government to rest upon the consent of the people.
And, in the end, the people must be the judge of legitimate government. Arbitrary power
and transgressions of the law by the sovereign power, either by the executive or
legislative branches, is not acceptable. This distinction highlights an underlying
distinction between the two philosophers’ conception of mankind, and the sovereign
himself. Hobbes believes life in the state of nature is nasty and brutish. As a result, men
require a strong authority figure to ensure that peace and security is established. But, this
sovereign, in order to be permitted arbitrary power, must also be at least partially divine.
If he is only a man, then he would have to succumb to the same passions and selfishness
as all other men. And, as a result, he could not be permitted the arbitrary authority that
Hobbes allows his sovereign. Locke, on the other hand, has an opposite view. He views
men as generally peaceful. He notes that all men are inherently free and equal. His
sovereign, in contrast to that of Hobbes, appears to be mortal. As a result, Locke
recognizes that he is fallible, and thus can be persuaded by self-interest. Locke limits his
power, then, because he predicts such behaviors. Because all men are both free and equal,
no man has a right to harm another. Thus, the sovereign may not be permitted the power
to objectify or injure any of his subjects because all men are equal. Locke’s recognition
of the humanity of the sovereign permits him the ability to give the people the ability to
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check the power of this sovereign. The ultimate aim for society is the peace and security
of the people, and the only way to accomplish this is protect men from any danger,
including the arbitrary and self-interested power of the sovereign. Thus, the right of
revolution, for these two philosophers, depends upon the different conceptions each has
both of human kind and of the sovereign himself.
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CHAPTER V – The American Founding
The previous discussion on the right of revolution is particularly relevant to the
American Founding. While the scope of this chapter will be limited, leaving out many of
the historical details of the American Revolution, it will consider the notion of the
separation of powers as a direct consequence of the political theory of both Thomas
Hobbes and John Locke. In particular, James Madison’s Federalist Papers, the
Declaration of Independence, and the Bill of Rights will be used to help illustrate the idea
that, for the Founding Fathers, the English represented a sovereign who had overstepped
its bounds. And, as such, the early Americans believed they retained a right to revolt
against these imperialist leaders. In particular, it was Hobbes’ fear of the natural state of
man combined with Locke’s skepticism of absolute authority that led to the confederation
of American states that united to expel the ruling authority of the English.
Madison begins his discussion of the separation of powers in his Federalist No.
47. In this essay, he addresses the arguments that each department in the federal and state
governments should be completely separate and distinct. He begins, “One of the principal
objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the constitution, is its
supposed violation of the political maxim, that the legislative, executive and judiciary
departments ought to be separate and distinct.”186 The argument of the Anti-Federalists,
who opposed the development of a federal government to serve as the unifying structure
for the individual states, is that any form of federal government would become tyrannical.
In particular, if the proposed legislative, executive, and judicial departments of this new
government structure were consolidated into the hands of a few men, then tyranny would
surely ensue. But, for Madison, there is a distinction between partial overlap and absolute
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involvement. He agrees that full consolidation of these powers into one body of people
would be problematic. He explains, “The accumulation of all powers legislative,
executive, and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether
hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny.”187 Thus, it is clear that the consolidation of all these powers in the same hands
would be problematic.
Madison, however, argues that the structure of the federal government does not
indicate such a dangerous consolidation of power. He notes that Montesquieu is often the
source of the argument against this structure of government. But, Madison’s
interpretation of Montesquieu’s argument notes that, while total integration of these
departments is inappropriate, there can be partial overlap between these departments. He
notes, “[Montesquieu] did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial
agency in, or no controul [sic] over the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words
import, and still more conclusively illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to
no more than this, that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the
same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental
principles of a free constitution, are subverted.”188 He argues that, even in British law,
there is significant overlap amongst the three branches. For example, the executive
magistrate retains some legislative authority, and occasionally the legislative body can
serve a judicial purpose, particularly in impeachment cases. And, these instances do not
pose a concern for the rights of the individual citizens.
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Madison then turns to cite instances within the state constitutions where these
powers continue to overlap. Again, his aim is to convince the Anti-Federalists that the
existence of a federal government will not necessarily result in tyranny. He notes, “New
Hampshire, whose constitution was the last formed…has qualified the doctrine by
declaring, ‘that the legislative, executive and judiciary departments ought to be kept as
separate from, and independent of each other as the nature of a free government will
admit.”189 If the legislative must intervene in the operations of the executive in order to
ensure the safety of the people, then that action would be permitted by the laws of the
state of New Hampshire. But, of course, that would be the only way to justify such an
intervention. The legislative body cannot intervene arbitrarily. The state of Virginia,
which attempts to take a more decisive position against the blending of political
authority, still excuses partial intervention. He highlights:
“The language of Virginia is still more pointed on the subject. Her constitution declares,
‘that the legislative, executive and judiciary departments, shall be separate and distinct;
so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other; nor shall any person
exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time; except that the justices of
the county courts shall be eligible to either house of assembly.’ Yet we find not only this
express exception…but that the chief magistrate with his executive council are
appointable by the legislature; that two members of the latter are triennially displaced at
the pleasure of the legislature; and that all the principal offices, both executive and
judiciary, are filled by the same department.”190
Thus, even in the strictest state constitutions, there is still an occasional permission of the
overlap between these different branches of government. Madison, in emphasizing these
examples, hopes to note that total separation of powers isn’t necessary. But, for both
Madison and the Anti-Federalists, a total consolidation of these different branches of
189 Madison, p. 264
190 Madison, p. 266
93
government in the hands of one person or a small body of people would be a recipe for
tyranny.
Madison is not satisfied just to demonstrate that these three branches of
government do not need to be totally distinct. Instead, he hopes to show that these three
departments must be intertwined, at least partially, in order to protect from the
encroachments from the other branches. That is to say, each department requires
protections from the other branches of government. It is here that one sees Madison’s
inheritance of Hobbes’ fallible nature of man and Locke’s skepticism of the nature of the
sovereign. The federal government is capable of acting unjustly and in a flawed manner
such that its structure requires built-in protections against such offenses. And, for
Madison, these protections take the form of a system of “checks and balances” such that
no branch of the government can garner enough power to overwhelm the efforts and
responsibilities of the other departments.
Madison begins his Federalist No. 48 by advancing his argument for the
necessary degree for these departments to be intertwined. He opens, “I shall undertake in
the next place, to shew that unless these departments be so far connected and blended, as
to give each other a constitutional controul over the others, the degree of separation
which the maxim requires as essential to a free government, can never in practice, be
duly maintained.”191 Madison is searching for practical and feasible methods by which to
enforce the structure of the federal government such that no department can assume
enough power to abuse its authority. He argues, “It will not be denied, that power is of an
encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits
assigned to it…the next and most difficult task, is to provide some practical security for
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each against the invasion of the others. What this security ought to be, is the great
problem to be solved.”192 For Madison, this issue is of dire importance. Without a series
of regulations, the federal government will be prone to abuses given that it will be
operated by self-interested human beings. And, in particular, Madison is concerned with
the authority of the legislative body. He notes, “But in a representative republic, where
the executive magistracy is carefully limited both in the extent and the duration of its
power; and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly…it is against the
enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy
and exhaust all their precautions.”193 Much like in Locke’s civil society, the legislative
body assumes the largest authority. And, as such, this department is the most likely to
abuse such power. Thus, Madison hopes to explore ways in which this department might
be restricted in its ability to misuse its authority.
Madison cites Thomas Jefferson’s “Notes on the state of Virginia” as a means to
demonstrate that actual and enforceable means must be pursued in order to limit the
power of the legislative body. Jefferson explains, “The concentrating these in the same
hands is precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation that
these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single one. One
hundred and seventy-three depots would surely be as oppressive as one.”194 Jefferson
warns that the numerous people constituting the legislative body do not indicate that the
legislative body is infallible. Furthermore, Jefferson warns that no practical measures
have been taken to ensure that these three bodies remain independent, even if not totally
distinct. He notes, “But no barrier was provided between these several powers. The
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judiciary and executive members were left on the legislative for their subsistence in
office…If therefore the legislative assumes executive and judiciary powers, no opposition
is likely to be made; nor if made can be effectual.”195 Thus, both Madison and Jefferson
notice that mere laws written in state constitutions are not enough to prevent the
strengthening of the legislative body. Rather, productive, applicable methods must be
sought to help restrict this department’s already overwhelming power.
Madison begins to develop his position on the separation of powers in his
Federalist No. 49. The Anti-Federalists have posed an issue for a federal form of
government: how do the people remain sovereign in a federalist system of government?
Madison begins to develop his solution to this problem. He notes, “As the people are the
only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter,
under which the several branches of government hold their power, is derived; it seems
strictly consonant to the republican theory, to recur to the same original authority, not
only whenever it may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new-model the powers of
government; but also whenever any one of the departments may commit encroachments
on the chartered authorities of others.”196 For Madison, the people always remain the
ultimate source of authority. Each of the departments of government derives its power
from the public, so it is unreasonable to suggest that any power, even the legislative body,
could assume a greater power over any of the other departments. The social contract that
the people agree to with the federal government affirms that the people will always
remain sovereign over the government. And, thus, no department of the government may
overstep its bounds. Madison elaborates, “The several departments being perfectly co-
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ordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is evident, can
pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their
respective powers.”197 Thus, the government cannot be trusted to self-regulate itself.
Rather, the people must reserve the right to monitor and judge the effectiveness and
judiciousness of the federal government. Madison notes, “and how are the encroachments
of the stronger to be prevented, or the wrongs of the weaker to be redressed, without an
appeal to the people themselves; who, as the grantors of the commission, can alone
declare its true meaning and enforce its observance?”198 Since the authority of the
government is derived from the people, it must be the people who always remain
sovereign over the government. This is a very Lockean interpretation of the effectiveness
of government, Madison contends that the people maintain a perpetual ability to
reconsider and reevaluate their system of government. But, of course, this raises the
concern: do the people reserve a right to revolt against the government whenever they
please? Are there limitations to this right? If so, what are they? And, if not, how can one
guarantee stability?
Madison understands this issue. He notes that referring to the whole society for
every issue of national concern poses an issue to the stability and structure of the
government. But, at the same time, he is skeptical about entrusting the already
empowered legislative body to represent the true will of the people. Yet, the judiciary and
the executive departments only represent a very small population of the entire society.
Thus, he remains convinced that the legislative body is most fit for this purpose. He
explains, “The members of the legislative department, on the other hand, are numerous.
197 Madison, p. 273
198 Madison, p. 273
97
They are distributed and dwell among the people at large…The nature of their public
trust implies a personal influence among the people, and that they are more immediately
confidential guardians of the rights and liberties of the people.”199 It appears, then, that
the legislative, given its ability to aptly understand and address the concerns of the
people, should be consulted regarding issues of constitutionality or government actions.
Madison concludes, “it is the reason of the public alone that ought to control and regulate
the government. The passions ought to be controuled and regulated by the government.
We found…that mere declarations in the written constitution, are not sufficient to restrain
the several departments within their legal limits. It appears in this, that occasional appeals
to the people would be neither a proper nor an effectual provision, for that purpose.”200
Thus, Madison rejects frequent reference to the public as an effective method for
regulating the government. Rather, he is willing to grant such a right to the legislative
body, the government body most closely intertwined with the will of the people.
But, perhaps, if the appeals to the people were periodic, or scheduled, then it
could simultaneously sustain the order of the government and empower the public as the
true sovereign. Madison, however, rejects this claim as still impractical. He notes that if
the intervals are too close together, then the complaints become too superfluous. And, if
the intervals are too spread out, the issues can never be successfully resolved in a timely
manner. The state of Pennsylvania, Madison notes, attempted to formulate a system
where political leaders, or censors, would address concerns of the constitutional limits of
the several powers of the government. Unfortunately, those men often succumbed to
political bias, or were involved in the government themselves, proving the system to be
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flawed and ineffective. But, Madison concludes this section by developing an interesting
and relevant point. He notes, “Is it to be presumed…the same state will be free from
parties? Is it to be presumed that any other state, at the same or any other given period,
will be exempt from them? Such an event ought to be neither presumed nor desired;
because an extinction of parties necessarily implies either a universal alarm for the public
safety, or an absolute extinction of liberty.”201 It is clear that, while frequent appeals to
the people may not be the most effective means for limiting the powers of the
government, Madison still very much believes in deliberation and debate as necessities of
freedom. The existence of one party, or political body or department, would be
detrimental to the liberty of the people. It is this understanding that reflects a Lockean
fear of the excessive power of the sovereign, or in this case government, body.
Thus, the problem still remains: if one cannot appeal to the people to enforce the
actions of the government, and if laws are not sufficient in theory, then how exactly does
one require the government to act in a constitutional manner? For Madison, the only way
to effectively guarantee the constitutionality of the actions of the government is by
structuring the government in such a way that it is difficult to act otherwise. He begins,
“In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different
powers of government…it is evident that each department should have a will of its own;
and consequently should be so constituted, that the members of each should have as little
agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others.”202 By structuring
the government in this manner, it would be difficult for each department to overstep its
bounds. Ideally, the people would choose the officers in each department, but Madison,
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for the sake of practicality, does permit some form of appointments, particularly in the
judiciary. But, he continues, “It is equally evident that the members of each department
should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others.”203 By separating these
departments to a considerable degree, it prevents the encroachment of one department
upon another. But, for Madison, this is not enough. He explains, “But the great security
against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in
giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and
personal motives, to resist encroachments of others.”204 Thus, for Madison, each
department must be given the proper methods by which to protect itself from the other
departments.
Madison’s concern about one department of government encroaching upon
another stems from his understanding of human nature. He notes, “It may be a reflection
on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to controul the abuses of
government. But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human
nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controuls on government would be necessary. In
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty
lies in this: You must first enable the government to controul [sic] the governed; and in
the next place, oblige it to controul itself.”205 This is the inherent difficulty within
government. The government, given that it is comprised of men, is necessarily fallible.
But, the government must assume some authority over the governed. It must be able to
enforce laws and oblige the governed to follow particular social norms. Yet, the
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government only retains this ability because each member of the society forewent his
own individual rights in order to erect this type of society. Thus, the conundrum stands.
The government needs the governed to remain stable, yet the governed need the
government just as much to maintain stability amongst personal relations. And, it is clear
that Madison inherits both a Lockean and Hobbesean perspective in his analysis. Like
Hobbes, Madison agrees that man is inherently selfish and flawed. People require the
government to enforce equal rights under the law. But, like Locke, Madison does not
exempt the members of government from this doctrine of fallibility. The people who
comprise the system of government are just that: people. They contain the same mortal
flaws that all other members of society do. Thus, they cannot be unconditionally trusted.
Rather, certain measures must be taken to ensure that these members of government act
judiciously. Thus, Madison hopes to build these types of limitations into the system of
government itself in order to ensure the stability of the state.
Madison, throughout his entire discussion, has noted that the legislative body in a
republican government is already given a sufficient advantage. Since it contains the most
members, and often the most power, it also has the greatest chance of abusing such
power. His solution for this is to divide the legislature into two separate bodies. He
explains, “The remedy for this inconveniency is, to divide the legislature into different
branches; and to render them by different modes of election, and different principles of
action, as little concerned with each other, as the nature of their common functions, and
their common dependence on the society, will admit.”206 This division of the two
legislatures would come to be the bicameral model of the American legislature. By
assigning each department its own responsibilities, and thus effectively dividing the size
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of the legislature, Madison has successfully weakened the strongest body of the federal
government. Furthermore, the structure of the American government poses another
question: how do state governments interact with the federal government? He notes, “the
power surrendered by the people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and
then the portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate departments.
Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will
controul each other; at the same time that each will be controuled by itself.”207 Thus, an
effective system of checks and balances must consider this dual structure of the American
system of government. Additionally, the American political structure is based on the
debates and deliberations amongst particular political parties. Thus, for Madison, one
must protect these parties from being overcome or overwhelmed by unfair majorities. He
argues, “Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority
be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.”208 But, for
Madison, this issue can be resolved by creating a number of factions, thus effectively
preventing against an overpowering majority. He explains, “by comprehending in the
society so many separate descriptions of citizens, as will render an unjust combination of
a majority of the whole, very improbably, if not impracticable…the society itself will be
broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals
or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the
majority.”209 Thus, for Madison, the federal government must protect against excess. It
must not excessively accumulate power, and it must monitor political parties, religious
groups, social organizations, and all other groups from becoming oppressive.
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Madison concludes his Federalist No. 51 with a strong discussion of the end of
government. He begins, “Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It
has ever been, and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the
pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and
oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign, as in a state of nature where
the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the strong.”210 Much like the
social contract theorists Hobbes and Locke, Madison recognizes the ultimate goal of
society: the protection of all citizens and the surety of justice for all. The only way to
accomplish this, however, is by limiting man such that he cannot indulge in arrogant or
selfish accumulation of power. The weak and the strong must be treated as equals; both
groups maintain equal rights under the law. Madison concludes, “In the extended republic
of the United States, and among the great variety of inters, parties and sects which it
embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any
other principles than those of justice and the general good...And happily for the
republican cause, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a
judicious modification and mixture of the federal principle.”211 Thus, for Madison, the
federalist approach to government provides the guarantees for all people that justice will
be pursued. And, it is the only way through which the government can both rule the
governed, as well as themselves.
While it was chronologically written prior to The Federalist Papers, the
Declaration of Independence also provides sound evidence that the Founding Fathers
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assumed both a Hobbesean and Lockean perspective regarding the English sovereign.
The quintessential document regarding the American Founding, it is a clear and explicit
declaration of the reasons for the secession of the original colonies. Additionally, it
serves as a strong supporting argument for the existence of a right of revolution. For the
sake of clarity, I will refer to Jefferson as the author of the Declaration, though I
recognize the number of contributors to the actual document. He begins, “When in the
Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political
bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the
earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God
entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare
the causes which impel them to separation.”212 From the onset, there is a strong indication
of the individual rights of man bestowed upon him by both God and Nature. Jefferson
continues, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness – That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed – That
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of
the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on
such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely
to effect their Safety and Happiness.”213 While Jefferson does not necessarily aim to
prove why he believes that man retains these particular rights, it is clear he believes that
these rights are necessarily a part of human nature. And, as such, these rights can never
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be forfeited or removed. Thus, like Locke, Jefferson believes that man retains the ability
to alter or overthrow the government whenever it does indeed attempt to limit man’s
natural rights.
But, much like Locke, Jefferson does not believe that man can overthrow his
government for any reason. He notes, “Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments
long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all
experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are
sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are
accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariable the
same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it
is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future
security.”214 This is a very strong declaration, for Jefferson does not believe that the right
to revolt is merely a right. Rather, he believes it is a duty of the people when the
government has overstepped its bounds and become tyrannical. When repeated abuses
have occurred, it is the obligation of the people to overturn the existing government and
establish a new system of government.
Jefferson notes the long train of abuses which the King of Britain has committed
against the residents of the colonies. It is his view that these qualify as the sort of
excessive abuses which would permit the people to reject and overthrow such a
government. Jefferson notes that the people have petitioned against such abuses, but have
only been treated by further oppression. He argues, “A Prince whose character is thus
marked by every act which may define a Tyrant is unfit to be the ruler of a free
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people.”215 The people, who are endowed with particular freedoms and rights, are able,
then, to reject the authority of a sovereign who repeatedly abuses his power by limiting
such liberties. He concludes:
“We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress,
Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our
intentions, do, in the Name, and by the Authority of the good People of these Colonies,
solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be
Free and Independent States, that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British
Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is
and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full
power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do
all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support
of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we
mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.”216
Thus, for Jefferson, the abuses of the British Empire have been sufficient for the
American colonies to start anew. With this Declaration, they may proceed as an
independent and free nation, with the right and the duty to absolve itself from the British
rule in favor of a new system of government.
Another example of the inclusion of Hobbesean and Lockean thought regarding
the role of the sovereign and the right of revolution can be found in The Bill of Rights.
The document begins, “THE Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of
their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or
abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added: And
as extending the ground of public confidence in the Government, will best ensure the
beneficent ends of its institution.”217 Thus, these particular rights are outlined as a way to
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prevent a despotic or tyrannical government from returning. In particular, the First
Amendment establishes a set of limitations as a way to limit the actions of Congress. It
declares, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assembly, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”218 Thus, with this initial declaration, Madison establishes the tone
and the goal of the new government to be formulated by the new Constitution.
A few of the other original amendments of The Bill of Rights also indicate a
desire to limit the excessive power of the Congress. The Fourth Amendment, which
states, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probably cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized,”219 very clearly
notes the right of man to live a private life. Additionally, the Sixth Amendment
guarantees, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”220 Thus, this amendment seeks to protect
individuals from the arbitrary will and prosecution of a tyrannical sovereign. The Eighth
Amendment, which states, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
218 Madison, “The Bill of Rights”
219 Madison, “The Bill of Rights”
220 Madison, “The Bill of Rights”
107
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments afflicted,” 221 further seeks to ensure the
freedom and safety of all citizens. The Ninth Amendment and Tenth Amendments seek to
ensure that, while certain explicit rights may not be enumerated in the actual
Constitution, this does not permit Congress to limit the liberty of the people. The Ninth
Amendment states, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”222 Thus, just because
certain rights are explicitly stated in the Constitution does not deny that other rights do
exist for the people. And, finally, the Tenth Amendment states, “The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”223 Any rights or powers which are
not listed in the body of the Constitution will be assigned to the States or the people as a
whole. Thus, the process of deciding which rights and powers are constitutional is a
continuous process which relies heavily on the will of the people.
The Federalist Papers, The Declaration of Independence, and The Bill of Rights
all demonstrate a Hobbesean and Lockean perspective on the role of the sovereign and
the right of revolution. The Federalist Papers help to illuminate the way in which the
Founding Fathers, in particular James Madison, interpreted the role of the legislative
government as an institution which simultaneously governs and must be governed. The
sovereign, as a man, cannot be fully trusted, and thus certain limitations must be installed
to help ensure that the government does not become tyrannical. This understanding
derives from Hobbes’ notion that man cannot be trusted to be altruistic, and from Locke’s
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understanding that the sovereign is merely a man among men and, thus, must be
accountable to the same laws as the governed. The Declaration of Independence, perhaps
the strongest affirmation of the right of revolution, clearly assumes a Lockean
perspective. It dictates that the people, when suffering sustained abuses, are permitted to
revolt. And, it is from Locke that Jefferson derives his notion of each man being entitled
to his life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. Finally, The Bill of Rights assumes several
Hobbesean and Lockean ideas. It is from Hobbes that the entire notion of limiting
interpersonal relations derives. Without this fundamental notion of what government’s
aim should be, The Bill of Rights would not exist. The limitations expressed in this
document demonstrate a fear of what man is capable of doing to his fellow man.
Furthermore, it is the way in which this document is applied to the government, and
particularly Congress, which exhibits a Lockean perspective. The government, since it is
comprised of men, is fully capable of being flawed. Thus, it, too, must be governed.
The fundamental difference between Hobbes’ and Locke’s ideas concerning the
right of revolution can be supported by these three documents. The American Founding
assumed Locke’s concept of the sovereign as being a fallible institution, made of men
who assumed the same flawed human nature as those who were to be governed. Thus, to
safeguard against tyranny, the Founding Fathers permitted a particular right of revolution
to be granted to the people. While Hobbes argued for the infallibility and perhaps the
immortality of the sovereign, Locke, Madison, and Jefferson all agree that the sovereign
must simultaneously be able to govern the people and be governed by the people.
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CONCLUSION
During my initial research, I had hoped to analyze the difference between the
right of revolution and the right of rebellion. Additionally, I originally planned to discuss
more of the historical aspects involving Thomas Hobbes’ and John Locke’s life which
had contributed to the differences between each philosopher’s ideas concerning the state
of nature. But, through the course of my reading, I found a significant difference between
the two author’s philosophies which I thought both interesting and relevant. In particular,
it was the difference between the way each philosopher interprets the nature and the role
of the sovereign which directly impacts whether or not the people retain a right to revolt.
Hobbes, who wrote Leviathan during the English Civil War, supports a strong sovereign,
perhaps in reaction to the chaotic era during which he lived. It is no surprise that he
desired order, and this order, he believed, must come from a demigod sovereign who is
granted absolute and unconditional power. Locke, on the other hand, advocates for a
sovereign whose powers must necessarily be limited. The state of nature, for Locke,
remains a much more peaceful entity, and thus rule by the sovereign cannot be more
unbearable than the state of nature. Should this be the case, people would merely revert
back to the state of nature. Thus, the sovereign’s powers must be limited to the pursuit of
the greater good. If the sovereign repeatedly abuses his power, the people may and should
rebel against him. Thus, it is the important difference between these two conceptions
which allows the people to retain a right to revolt.
In addition, it is this difference which influenced the American Founding Fathers
when they drafted the Declaration of Independence, The Bill of Rights, and The
Federalist Papers. In these documents, it is clear that the British king was seen as an
110
abusive sovereign power. And, with a Lockean perspective, the Founding Fathers
believed they had an unalienable right and duty to overthrow such a tyrannical power.
Furthermore, in The Federalist Papers and The Bill of Rights, it is clear that they believed
that they needed to delimit the rights and powers of the sovereign. In The Federalist
Papers, Madison outlines specific checks and balances for the three branches of
government, going to particular ends to limit the power of the legislative branch.
Furthermore, The Bill of Rights serves as a limit on the powers of Congress regarding its
interaction with the people. Thus, the American Founding relied upon a very Lockean
fear that the sovereign could be trusted in all cases. And, of course, this fear of the nature
of man, stems from Hobbes. Thus, it appears that the American Founding Fathers
inherited a skeptical view of the nature of man in the abstract, as well as in the role of the
sovereign, which permitted them to both revolt against the British Empire as well as
establish a government set upon limits of power.
Upon examination, I believe this idea of revolution as the reaction to a long series
of abuses is particularly relevant in the current political climate. One need not look
beyond the borders of the United States in order to find a revolutionary spirit. For
example, the Tea Party movement very much looked to the origins of this nation as
inspiration for its political positions. The idea that government should be for the people
and by the people, a core ideal for this movement, derives from the very notion of
consent, so central to the American Founding and Lockean political theory. When
government gets too big, and passes billion dollar legislation or endorses new programs
which may not appeal to the masses, it could be viewed as a tyrannical power who is
disregarded the will of the people. In the case of a long train of abuses, revolution will
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occur. While a total disintegration of the United States government would be apocalyptic,
it is possible to interpret the 2010 mid-term elections as a direct reaction, or revolution,
against the Obama administration. The American system was built to ensure that no such
abuse of power could be possible. And, when such an abuse does, as could be claimed
has been the case during the current administration, a political movement or revolution is
the only method to resolve the issue. Thus, the spirit of the Founding Fathers still very
much lives on.
Furthermore, the recent series of revolutions in the Middle East can be viewed in
a similar light. While many of these nations are not built upon Western concepts of
liberalism or democracy, it appears that the same ideas hold true. When a sovereign has
acted in an abusive manner, the people can only tolerate so much. When it becomes too
overwhelming, the people will revolt. The fact that these nations have a very different
cultural and political tradition speaks to the universality of this principle of revolution.
Whenever a sovereign rejects the will of the people, they no longer consent to be ruled by
him. And, when the ruler is seen as a man amongst men, this only adds fuel to the fire.
When he is seen as vulnerable and no longer as a demigod aristocrat or divinely-inspired
monarch, then the sovereign may be overthrown. Thus, the same revolutionary spirit
which has been part of the American fabric has similarities in other areas of the world.
In summary, the right of revolution depends both upon the way in which one
determines the right of man and the way one interprets the role of the sovereign. When
mankind is conceived to be free, equal, and corrupt, and the sovereign is interpreted as
being a mere man amongst men, then the right of revolution is the only way to ensure the
peace and the security of the people.
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